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UNITED THEY STAND, DIVIDED THEY FALL:
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND THE
TAX CODE
Julie A. Roint
Though ostensibly assessed on "all income from whatever
source derived,"' it has long been obvious that the federal income
tax base partially or wholly excludes many items which fit both a
layman's and an economist's definition of income.2 As a result, tax-
payers interested in maximizing their after-tax gains expend consid-
erable time and effort trying to fit their income producing activities
or receipts into tax-favored categories.3 Congress allows and even
encourages these tax minimization efforts. 4 On the other hand,
Congress imposes numerous barriers against their excessive use to
prevent the wholesale erosion of the tax base. Some congressio-
nally imposed barriers are straightforward and obvious while others
are sufficiently subtle that they are often overlooked. This Article
focuses on one such subtle barrier: the conditioning of a desired tax
benefit on a relatively large number of taxpayers with disparate in-
terests working together on a common tax minimization scheme. As
a theoretical matter, achieving such cooperation will be difficult if
not impossible, thus reducing the availability of the associated tax
benefits.
This Article looks at two contexts in which this barrier to tax
benefits is imposed, evaluates the relative successes and failures of
t Assistant Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to thank
Hank Gutman, Saul Levmore, and Paul Stephan for their insightful comments on earlier
drafts of this article. I am also indebted to participants in faculty workshops at the Uni-
versity of Virginia School of Law and Yale Law School. Finally, I owe special thanks to
Craig Fishman for his research assistance.
1 I.R.C. § 61(a) (1988). Unless specifically stated otherwise, all references to the
Internal Revenue Code (the "Code" or "I.R.C.") hereinafter will be to the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1986, as amended November 1988.
2 See D. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX
REFORM 3 (2d ed. 1984); W. KLEIN, B. BIXrKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
51 (7th ed. 1987).
3 For a history of tax avoidance devices and a description of their modem incarna-
tions, see Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and Controlling Income Ta Avoidance,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 657 (1985).
4 Indeed, Congress enacted many of the special exclusion, deduction, and credit
provisions of the Code to entice taxpayers to behave in ways that Congress considered
desirable. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT-FISCAL YEAR 1976 67 (Feb. 1976).
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the barrier in those contexts, and speculates on the barrier's future
utility as a limitation device. Part I, relying on principles of voting
theory developed by economists working in the field of public
choice,5 explains why requiring a group of taxpayers to work to-
gether on a common tax minimization scheme is an effective barrier
against the success of the scheme. Parts II and III detail the history
and current operation of group consensus rules in two parts of the
Internal Revenue Code, and Part IV speculates on future applica-
tions of this anti-avoidance mechanism.
I
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
Public choice is the study of processes of aggregating individual
preferences to reach group and social decisions. 6 Public choice the-
orists grapple with two related problems. First, theorists seek a nor-
mative definition of "maximum social utility" or which social state
ought to be chosen, given the individual preferences of voters. 7
Second, theorists study the effect of actual procedures for aggregat-
ing individual preferences, and in particular, how well different vot-
ing rules serve the goal of reaching that social maximum. 8
Although public choice theory was developed primarily to ex-
plain and evaluate political processes, 9 in recent years it has also
informed legal analysis. When applied to the deliberative processes
of administrative agencies'0 and courts" public choice principles
explain why these institutions sometimes hand down decisions that
are inconsistent with their own prior decisions. These principles
also have served as the basis for attacking doctrines promulgated as
guides for the resolution of future disputes by agencies and
5 "Public choice," "collective choice," and "social choice" are terms used to de-
scribe a type of economic and political science research into methods for making social
decisions. A more complete description of this field of research is contained infra text
accompanying notes 6-13. In the interest of avoiding confusion, this article only uses
the term "public choice" to describe the field of research.
6 See Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 813-14 (1982).
7 See D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 2 (1979).
8 Id.
9 See, e.g.,J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUN-
DATIONS OF CONSITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (applying public choice principles to de-
cision-making rules in constitutional democracy); D. MUELLER, supra note 7, at 4 (noting
that "many contributors to public choice have worked in or started from public fi-
nance"); R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 108-25
(3d ed. 1980) (applying public choice principles to the budgetary process).
10 See, e.g., Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561
(1977); Spitzer, Radio Formats by Administrative Choice, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 647 (1980);
Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations ofAgency Clien-
tele Relationships, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981).
I 1 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 6; Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: An Applica-
tion of Public Choice Theory to Bakke, The FCC, and the Courts, 88 YALE LJ. 717 (1979).
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courts. 12
One of the most important contributions of public choice theo-
rists has been the development of the "impossibility theorem": the
idea that it is impossible to reach a predictable and stable social de-
cision in situations where individuals, choosing among at least three
different options, do not rank their choices among the options along
a single spectrum, or in a "single-peaked" manner. In such situa-
tions, any one of several choices will be equally good (or bad); none
will be "best." 13 Obviously, the absence of a definitively "best
choice" does not necessarily prevent any decision from being made,
but the decision that is made will be controversial, in some sense
counter-majoritarian, and therefore subject to challenge, review,
and reform. 14
To put the matter in a tax context, consider the dilemma facing
an employer that, after learning about the tax benefits accorded em-
ployer-provided fringe benefits, 15 decides to offer the next wage in-
crease for its three employees in the form of a nontaxable fringe
benefit. Assuming the employer is only willing to raise wages
enough to cover the cost of providing one of three equally expen-
sive benefits-health insurance, life insurance, or dependent care-
how does the employer go about deciding which benefit to provide?
The employer will be inclined to choose the benefit yielding the
most satisfaction to its employees as a group. 16 However, determin-
ing which of the three benefits best achieves this end is an impossi-
ble task if the employees prefer the various benefits in the rank-
order described in the chart below.
12 See Spitzer, supra note 10, at 682-87 (criticizing rules for review of changes in
radio station formats); Spitzer, supra note I 1 (criticizing admissions policy approved in
Bakke decision and FCC licensing standards).
13 Stated in terms used by public choice theorists, where the individuals have
"multi-peaked preferences," no choice will definitively generate a "maximum social util-
ity" or "nonarbitrary result" for the affected individuals. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE,
supra note 9, at 11. Some commentators refer to this principle of decisionmaking as the
"Arrow Theorem" in honor of Kenneth Arrow, whose proof of its validity in K. ARROW,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963) helped earn him a Nobel Prize.
See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 823.
14 See D. MUELLER, supra note 7, at 224-26 (describing problem of reaching stable
outcome on redistributive issues as "the infinite regress problem"); id. at 49 (prophesiz-
ing high "indexes of 'voter antagonism' "and "probability of cycles" when multi-peaked
preference items at issue); Weingast, supra note 10, at 154 ("as long as new proposals
can be made, majority rule choice has no natural stopping point").
15 These benefits, and the reason their availability entices employers to provide
fringe benefits in lieu of cash salary, are explained in detail below. See infra notes 24, 32-
38, 152-56 and accompanying text.
16 The more value employees attach to the benefit, the more cash salary such em-
ployees will be willing to give up in order to receive it, and the less expensive the total
compensation package is likely to be. See infra text accompanying notes 155-56.
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Table #1
Employee Health Insurance Life Insurance Dependent Care
A 1 2 3
B 3 1 2
C 2 3 1
The instability or arbitrariness of any solution reached by sub-
mitting the issue to a vote by the affected employees demonstrates
the central point of the "impossibility theorem." Assume a simple
majority rule is utilized to determine the outcome with voting in a
two step process. First, the voters compare one benefit to another
and then they compare the survivor of that vote to the third benefit.
Under this two step process, the "winning fringe" depends on the
voting sequence: the order in which the benefits are paired and put
to a vote. If the initial pairing is between life insurance and health
insurance, health insurance wins in the initial pairing (preferred by
A and C), only to be overcome by dependent care in the second
pairing (preferred by B and C). If, on the other hand, the initial
pairing is between health insurance and dependent care, dependent
care prevails in the first pairing but life insurance is later the overall
winner (preferred over dependent care by A and B). Finally, if the
initial pairing is between life insurance and dependent care, the ini-
tial winner is life insurance, and the eventual winner is health insur-
ance. No matter what the outcome, a majority of the employees will
be dissatisfied because they prefer another fringe to the one that has
been chosen. Presumably, these dissatisfied employees would lobby
for a new "election" at the earliest possible opportunity. However,
a new election will leave an equal number of employees dissatisfied,
because once again, there will be no "best" choice. Rather, the win-
ner of the next election, like that of the first election, will depend on
the sequence in which the voting takes place.
The person or institution controlling the voting sequence (the
"agenda") also controls the election's outcome.' 7 If the "control-
17 See D. MUELLER, supra note 7, at 45 ("if one voter can control the agenda at each
step of voting 'he can construct an agenda which will arrive at any point in space, in
particular his ideal point' "); Levine & Plott, supra note 10, at 589 ("[R]esearch suggests
that processes commonly used to reach important decisions may be subject to a degree
of agenda influence ranging from mild to surprising."); Weingast, supra note 10, at 154
("[A]genda ... plays a crucial rule in policy choice. Those with the power to manipulate
the agenda gain considerable influence over final policy choice .. "). On the strategic
use of the agenda, see Plott & Levine, A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions, 68
AM. EcoN. REv. 146 (1978). The mechanisms by which such control is developed and
exercised have provided a fertile topic for public choice research. E.g., Easterbrook,
supra note 6, at 819-21 (effects of stare decisis on decisions of the Supreme Court); Wein-
gast, supra note 10 (discussing "real world decision processes" subject to agenda influ-
ences such as run-offs and primaries, deliberations of administrative commissions and
appellate courts and jury deliberations).
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ler" has a preference for a particular outcome it can, and presuma-
bly will, impose that preference on the group. In the absence of a
"controller," one would expect the outcome to vary randomly over
time among the three alternatives. Because a majority of the em-
ployees will continue to be dissatisfied with the outcome of each
election, this sequence of events will continue unendingly (and
probably unpleasantly). In public choice parlance, a "cycle" will be
generated.' 8 The cycle cannot be "solved" by altering the voting
procedure to take into account employees' intensities as well as
ranking of preferences, because employees who do not honestly
state their positions can manipulate such a procedure.' 9
Prospects for employee satisfaction are no less bleak if the em-
ployer decides to impose a solution unilaterally, rather than to sub-
mit the issue to a vote. Any solution the employer imposes will be
as vulnerable, and thus unstable, as an elected solution because no
"right" answer exists. In essence, the impossibility theorem estab-
lishes that there is no proverbial "happy medium" in situations
where the affected individuals have "multi-peaked" (as opposed to
"single-peaked") preferences.20
The impossibility of reaching a "best" solution does not neces-
sarily mean that in all circumstances the employer will decide
against granting any tax-favored fringe benefits. However, under
certain circumstances, the employer will opt to provide only cash
compensation. Such an outcome benefits the federal treasury be-
cause cash salary, unlike fringe benefits, is taxable income. 2' It is,
therefore, especially interesting that the Code's rules providing for
the tax-favored treatment of fringe benefits tended to create circum-
stances in which the impossibility theorem applies-in short, the
Code operated to minimize revenue loss by exploiting the effects of
the impossibility theorem. What is even more interesting is that the
major tool for achieving this end was a set of nondiscrimination
rules ostensibly designed to broaden taxpayer access to tax-favored
fringe benefits.2 2 The next section discusses how the nondiscrimi-
18 See Weingast, supra note 10, at 154 (pervasive cycling).
19 See D. MUELLER, supra note 7, at 198-99 (procedures in which intensity of prefer-
ence taken into account "vulnerable to strategizing"); R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE,
supra note 9, at 116 ("The better the rule in the absence of strategy... the greater tends
to be the scope which it leaves for the use of strategy.").
20 See supra note 13.
21 See infra text accompanying note 150.
22 See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 38-39 (1976) (exclusion for
group legal services plans enacted to "increase the access to legal services for many
taxpayers... especially ... middle income taxpayers"; nondiscrimination rules to "mini-
mize the possibility of abuse"); S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1978) (non-
discrimination required in educational assistance plans to ensure program "available to
a broad class of employees."); H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1592 (1984)
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nation rules have accomplished this end and the effect recent
changes in the Code will have on this implicit design.
II
EMPLOYEE FRINGE BENEFITS
A. The Genesis of Nondiscrimination Rules
As a general rule, all compensation is includable in the taxable
income of the person who earns it, regardless of the medium of pay-
ment.23 An employee who receives a $300 air conditioner, for ex-
ample, is supposed to pay the same amount of income tax as a
similarly situated employee who receives $300 cash instead. The
reason for this rule is obvious; any other rule would encourage the
development of a barter economy 24 at the cost of tax revenues, 25
economic efficiency, 26 and basic horizontal equity.27
(nondiscrimination rule included because "it would be fundamentally unfair to provide
tax-free treatment for economic benefits that are furnished only to highly paid execu-
tives"). Cf Tax Treatment of Employee Fringe Benefits: Written Comments and Hearings Before a
Task Force of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1978) (testi-
mony of Donald Lubick, Asst. Sec'y of the Treasury for Tax Policy) ("policy to en-
courage the development of broadly based private pension plans has been carried out by
the provisions which require ... a broad standard of nondiscrimination") [hereinafter
Lubick Testimony]. But see Fox & Schaffer, Tax Policy as Social Policy: Cafeteria Plans,
1978-1985, 12J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 609, 630 (1987) (describing mixed motives of
Treasury officials seeking enactment of nondiscrimination rules).
23 See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (1988):
[I]f services are paid for in property, the fair market value of the property
taken in payment must be included in income as compensation. If serv-
ices are paid for in exchange for other services, the fair market value of
the services taken in payment must be included in income as
compensation.
Id. See also Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945) (statutory predecessor of
I.R.C. § 61(a) "is broad enough to include in taxable income any economic or financial
benefit conferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by
which it is effected").
24 If we lived in a country where cash salaries were taxable while other forms of
salary were not, an employee in a 25% marginal tax rate bracket would prefer $230 in
untaxed "property" to $300 in cash. Employers would be even more delighted to avoid
$70 in labor costs. One could expect, therefore that every employee would seek pay-
ment in property rather than cash. Ultimately, property transfers (barter) would drive
out cash as a medium of exchange in the labor market. See M. GRAETz, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 116-17 (2d ed. 1988).
25 As more and more salaries came in nontaxable form, the tax base would dimin-
ish, and, absent an increase in tax rates, revenue collections would drop accordingly.
26 Especially if employees are limited in the types of property they may choose tax
free, employees may elect to receive wage-property packages very different from those
they would choose in a tax free world. M. GRAETZ, supra note 24, at 117. Such changes
in expenditure patterns can create not only what economists call a "deadweight loss," see
W. KLEIN, B. BrrrER, & L. STONE, supra note 2, at 116-17; Clotfelter, Equity, Efficiency,
and the Tax Treatment of In-Kind Compensation, 32 NAT'L TAXJ. 51 (1979), but also they can
actually result in inflation of the costs of the "oversubscribed" activity. E.g., Feldstein,
The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. POL. ECON. 251, 252 (1973); Kosters &
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As an administrative matter, however, the Internal Revenue
Service has not required employees to include in income the value
of air-conditioning and similar benefits consumed at their work-
place.2 8 Similarly, taxpayers need not include in income the amount
of personal benefit derived from a large, well-appointed office. 29
Exclusion is the rule even in cases where the employees explicitly
bargain away cash wages in exchange for improved working condi-
tions. The traditional explanations for excluding such items from
the tax base are that, because these items are provided primarily for
business purposes, an employee's personal benefit is likely to be mi-
nor and the benefit will be difficult to value accurately.30 In short,
inclusion would require too much work for too little revenue gain.
As might be expected, 31 employers and employees have sought
to expand the category of expenditures that qualify for treatment as
fringe benefits to the employee beyond those benefits consumed at
the workplace. Such items benefit employees just like cash salary
but have the dual tax advantages of not being income to the em-
ployee and being deductible to the employer.
The Internal Revenue Service, and eventually Congress, 3 2
Steuerle, The Effect of Fringe Benefit Tax Policies on Labor and Consumer Markets, 74 NTA-TIA
86, 90-91 (1981).
27 Those employees and employers unable to work out a property transfer arrange-
ment in lieu of cash salary would incur an unfair tax burden-especially if tax rates rose
to ameliorate the revenue loss. See M. GRAETZ, supra note 24, at 117. See also H.R. REP.
No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 287 (1983), expressing concern that:
without any well-defined limits on the ability of employers to compensate
their employees tax free by using a medium other than cash, new prac-
tices will emerge that could shrink the income tax base significantly, and
further shift a disproportionate tax burden to those individuals whose
compensation is in the form of cash.
Id.
28 Simon, Fringe Benefits and Tax Reform: Historical Blunders and a Proposalfor Structural
Change, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 871, 876 (1984). Congress did not explicitly authorize this
policy until 1984. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531(a), 98
Stat. 494, 879 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 132(d)) (excluding "working condition
fringe benefits" from income).
29 Simon, supra note 28, at 876.
30 Id.; M. GRAETz, supra note 24, at 137.
31 See supra note 24 (describing the financial benefits of avoiding employee-level
income taxation of salary amounts).
32 As can be gleaned from the history of the various fringe benefit provisions con-
tained infra notes 33-37, administrative acceptance of fringe benefit exclusions generally
preceded explicit statutory authorization for such exclusions. Most of the statutory ex-
clusions were enacted in the late 1970's and early 1980's. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-445, § 2134(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1926 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 120) (excluding the value of qualified group legal service plans from income); Energy
Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, § 242(a), 92 Stat. 3174, 3193 (codified as amended
at I.R.C. § 124) (excluding the value of employer-provided qualified transportation from
income); Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 164(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2811 (codi-
fied as amended at I.R.C. § 127) (excluding the value of educational assistance programs
from income); Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 124(e)(1), 95
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proved receptive to these efforts, allowing tax-free treatment of such
disparate benefits as life insurance,33 health and accident insur-
ance,34 dependent care,35 educational assistance,36 and free or dis-
counted sales of the employer's product.3 7 Although some of these
items are like air-conditioned work places in that they can be par-
tially or totally consumed on the business premises of the employer,
many confer benefits on employees outside the workplace. More
Stat. 172, 198-99 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 129) (excluding the value of depen-
dent care assistance programs from income); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-369, §§ 531-532, 98 Stat. 494, 877-87 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 132, 133
and 117) (excluding the value of miscellaneous traditional employee fringe benefits
from income).
33 In 1920, the Solicitor of the Internal Revenue held that the value of employer-
provided group-term life insurance was not income for purposes of the income tax laws.
L.O. 1014, 2 C.B. 88 (1920). By the 1960's, this position was so noncontroversial that
Treasury incorporated it into a regulation. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(2)(1963). The fol-
lowing year, Congress codified a modified version of the rule as section 79 of the Code.
Section 79 provided that employees could exclude from gross income the value of the
first $50,000 in coverage of employer-provided, group-term life insurance, but had to
include the value of any excess at rates specified in the regulations. See Revenue Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 204(a)(1), 78 Stat. 19, 36 (current version at I.R.C. § 79).
As the regulation rates are generally set at close to the costs large employers face when
obtaining insurance for their employees-thus reflecting substantial volume discounts-
the resulting inclusion often understates the market value of the insurance provided. See
T.D. 7924, 1984-1 C.B. 23, 23 (table uses 10.5% loading charge, 7 points lower than
arithmetic mean of such charges on a policy by policy basis); Insurance: IRS Proposes New
Table to Determine Group-Term Life Insurance Costs, 130 DAILY TAX REP. G-4 (July 6, 1983)
(loading charges vary from 5% for large, experience-rated groups to 30% for small
groups); cf. I.R.C. § 89(g)(3)(c)(ii) (value of excess benefits includable in employee's in-
come due to discriminatory nature of life insurance plan is the greater of actual cost of
excess coverage and cost of such coverage determined under section 79(c)).
34 The Internal Revenue Service ruled in 1943 that employers could deduct and
employees could exclude from gross income premiums paid by an employer for group
medical care and hospitalization insurance. Special Ruling, 3 Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) $
6587 (1943). When Congress codified that rule at section 106 in 1954, it extended the
exclusion to individual policies as well. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 186
(1955) ("the exclusion is applicable regardless of whether the employer's plan covers
one employee or a group of employees").
35 Congress first authorized the exclusion from employees' gross income of the
value of certain dependent care assistance programs provided by an employer in the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 124(e)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 198-
99 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 129).
36 Congress enacted this exclusion as a temporary measure as part of the Revenue
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 164(a), 92 Star. 2763, 2811 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 127). Originally limited to taxable years beginning before January 1, 1983, Congress
thrice extended its life, see Educational Assistance Programs, Pub. L. No. 98-611, § 1(a),
98 Stat. 3176, 3176 (1984); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1162, 100
Stat. 2085, 2510; Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
647, § 4001, 102 Stat. 3342, 3643; it is currently set to expire with taxable years begin-
ning before January 1, 1988. I.R.C. § 127(d).
37 Congress codified a preexisting informal administrative practice of ignoring
these items for tax purposes when it enacted section 132 of the Code as part of the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. See Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit Legislation: A Codification
of Historical Inequities, 34 CATm. U.L. REV. 425, 427-29 (1985).
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importantly, the cost of most of these fringe benefits could not be
deducted as work related expenses by employees who purchased
them directly. 38 Indeed, in some cases Congress abandoned any
pretense of a link between the tax-free fringe benefits and the needs
of the workplace and described their exclusion from income as tax
subsidies for socially desirable expenditures. 39 These fringe bene-
fits-excludable from an employee's income if provided by his em-
ployer but not deductible from the employee's income if he
purchases them himself-are the focus of this section.40
The employer's ability to distribute these benefits to employees
on a tax-free basis is not unlimited. The Code conditions the
favorable tax treatment of benefits provided to highly paid or high
ranking employees on the employer's provision of similar benefits,
on similar terms, to a number of lower paid and lower ranking em-
ployees. 4' In short, employers who discriminate against lower paid
and lower ranking employees by failing to provide them with a share
of tax-free fringe benefits run the risk of forfeiting the tax-free treat-
ment of benefits provided other employees. 42
As the discussion below explains, the rules for determining
whether lower paid employees have been granted their "fair share"
of benefits have evolved from a vague administrative requirement
that employers provide benefits to a "group" of employees into an
extraordinarily complex set of "nondiscrimination rules." The tale
of how and why these rules developed as they did is an interesting
example of how integration of the tax system and social legislation
has greatly complicated the revenue raising process. It is recounted
here, however, because one cannot understand how well the nondis-
38 Taxpayers personally purchasing dependent care assistance obtain partial tax re-
lief in the form of a limited credit, and those purchasing health insurance obtain a de-
duction. See I.R.C. § 21(c) (providing tax credit of between 20% and 30% on up to
$4800 of child care expenses); I.R.C. § 213(a) (allowing itemized deduction for ex-
penses of obtaining health insurance to the extent such expenses, together with other
medical costs incurred by taxpayer during the taxable year exceed 7.5% of taxpayer's
adjusted gross income for the year); and I.R.C. § 162(m) (providing self-employed indi-
viduals with above-the-line deduction for 25% of costs of obtaining health insurance).
However, for many taxpayers neither the credit nor the deduction is as valuable as a
complete exclusion.
39 E.g., S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1964) ($70,000 life insurance
exemption provided to encourage employers to provide life insurance); S. REP. No. 938,
supra note 22, at pt. 2, at 38-39 (exclusion for prepaid legal services provided to promote
access of middle income taxpayers to legal services).
40 Employer provided pensions involve independent issues which are beyond the
scope of this Article.
41 See infra text and notes 52-145 (describing statutory nondiscrimination rules).
42 The consequences of discrimination vary according to the benefit being pro-
vided. Discriminatory provision of some benefits causes only highly paid or high rank-
ing employees to lose the benefit of the exclusion, while all recipients must include in
income the value of other types of benefits received pursuant to discriminatory plans.
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crimination rules work to impose the condition of "multi-peaked"
preferences necessary for the impossibility theorem to come into
play43 without grasping some of the details of the statutory scheme.
Moreover, one can not appreciate the importance of (or the difficul-
ties involved in changing) some of those details without understand-
ing how they came to be adopted in the first instance.
1. Administrative Antecedents of Nondiscrimination Rules
Well before the advent of formal nondiscrimination rules, the
fringe benefit exclusions contained a restriction which arguably had
the same distributional effect: the requirement that benefits come in
"group" form. For example, the first administrative ruling to con-
front the tax treatment of employer-provided life insurance held
that the value of this insurance could be excluded from the recipi-
ent's income only if the insurance was issued under a group-term
policy.44 A later ruling clarified the earlier holding, stating that in-
surance provided pursuant to an individual term insurance policy
did not qualify for favorable tax treatment.45 This distinction was
carried through into each regulatory and statutory enactment of the
life insurance exclusion.46
Although a group insurance policy need not cover both lower
and higher paid employees in a given business, both Congress and
the Treasury initially assumed this would usually be the case.47 In-
43 See supra note 13.
44 L.O. 1014, 2 C.B. 88.
45 Gen. Couns. Mem. 8432 (1930) (premiums on individual term insurance policy
for corporate executive includable in his income); Gen. Couns. Mem. 16,069 (1936) (re-
affirming that insurance must cover a group of employees to qualify for the exclusion).
46 See Walker, Group Life Insurance, 23 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 154-56 (1965)
(recounting regulatory and statutory evolution of life insurance exclusion). The admin-
istrative ruling allowing employees to exclude the value of employer-provided health
insurance from income similarly confined itself to group plans. See supra note 34. How-
ever, Congress eliminated this restriction when it codified the exclusion in 1954. Id. At
the same time, Congress decided against including an explicit nondiscrimination rule in
section 105 of the Code, which excluded amounts paid to employees as compensation
for injuries and sickness under health and accident "plans" maintained by their employ-
ers. Such a provision was included in the version of the tax bill passed by the House, see
H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 105, 100 CONG. REC. 2957 (1954); however, the Sen-
ate deleted it, see S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 34, at 16, and the House receded in
conference. See CONF. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1954). One commen-
tator half-heartedly argues that the deletion occurred for technical reasons and that an
implied nondiscriminatory requirement remained. See Note, Taxation of Employee Accident
and Health Plans Before and Under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE LJ. 222, 234-35 & nn.78-79
(1954). For further discussion of the issues raised in the 1954 codification, see id.; Pyle,
Accident and Sickness Insurance Under Code Sections 104, 105, 106 and 213, 34 TAXEs 363,
365-73 (1956).
47 Several commentators point out that there were no formal restrictions on dis-
crimination in employer-provided life insurance plans at least until the enactment of
section 79 in 1964. See Fasan, Income Tax Treatment of Premiums Paid by an Employer on
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deed, when taxpayers and their insurers began deviating from this
norm, various statutory and regulatory changes appeared in the life
insurance provisions to ensure that coverage did not favor execu-
tives. 48 The courts enforced these regulatory restrictions, regularly
finding that too great a discrepancy between the coverage afforded
high and low income employees placed an insurance plan outside
the definition of a "group" policy. 49
2. Statutory Evolution
The first explicit statutory nondiscrimination rule appeared in
1942 as a condition precedent to special tax treatment of certain
pension plans and deferred compensation arrangements. 50
Although nondiscrimination rules became an increasingly important
element of federal regulation of pension plans in the years that fol-
lowed, Congress did not begin imposing statutory restrictions on
Group-Term Life Insurance Which Covers Only the Lives of Owner-Employees, 47 TAXEs 496,497-
98 (1969); Guthnes, Group Term Life Insurance, Income and Estate Tax Consequences of '64 Act
and Regulations, 103 TR. & EST. 1094, 1094 (1964). However, another commentator con-
cludes that their absence is "misleading" because, at least initially, state insurance laws
and insurance companies' underwriting requirements provided some protection against
discrimination. See Walker, supra note 46, at 162 (citing requirement of distinguishing
between group and individual policies, prohibition against individual selection, and low
state limits on group policy benefits as guards against excessive discrimination in early
years of exclusion). Further, in the health insurance context, many congressmen be-
lieved until quite recently that insurance considerations would force most employers to
use nondiscriminatory group plans even in the absence of any congressional directive.
See S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 22, at 186 ("underwriting considerations generally pre-
clude . . . abuses in insured [health] plans"). Despite evidence of past abuses, many
continued to believe that underwriting requirements, as well as the fact that group insur-
ance policies become cheaper as the size of the group increases, deterred discrimina-
tion. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N AND STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS TO INCREASE REVENUES 88 (Comm. Print
1982) ("[Clost savings resulting from including a large number of individuals in an in-
sured plan already tend to discourage discrimination.").
48 When it enacted section 79, Congress capped the insurance exclusion at $50,000
to prevent highly paid corporate executives from receiving "excessive" amounts of tax
favored coverage. See S. REP. No. 830, supra note 39, at 45. To prevent abuse by owner-
employees, the 1966 regulations under this section provided, "[a] plan under which in-
surance is available only to employees who own stock in the employer corporation does
not qualify as a plan or group insurance for purposes of section 79 .. ", Treas. Reg.
§ 1.79-1(b)(1)(iii)(b) (1967). More generally, the regulations required the insurance
policy to "preclude individual selection." Id.
49 See, e.g., Towne v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 791 (1982) (holding a policy applicable
to company president was not part of group-term plan because it allowed "individual
selection" of coverage amount); Braswell v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1053
(1981) (same); Whipple Chrysler-Plymouth v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 230,
233-34 (1972) (insurance policy applicable solely to owner of dealership not a group
plan).
50 Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 162(a), 56 Stat. 798, 862 (1943).
For a description of the history of this provision and the controversy surrounding its
enactment, see Tarleau, Development of Legislation on Pension Trusts, 77 J. AcCT. 376, 379-
81 (1944).
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other fringe benefits until the late 1970's. At that time, Congress
began enacting explicit statutory sanctions for a host of new tax-free
fringe benefits.5 1
Congress first provided a fringe benefits nondiscrimination rule
in the enabling legislation for group legal services. 52 This rule, con-
tained in section 120(c) of the Code,53 provided:
(1) DISCRIMINATION-The contributions or benefits provided
under the plan shall not discriminate in favor of employees who
are officers, shareholders, self-employed individuals, or highly
compensated.
(2) ELIGIBILITY-The plan shall benefit employees who qualify
under a classification set up by the employer and found by the
Secretary not to be discriminatory in favor of employees who are
described in paragraph (1). For purposes of this paragraph, there
shall be excluded from consideration employees not included in
the plan who are included in a unit of employees covered by an
agreement which the Secretary of Labor finds to be a collective
bargaining agreement between employee representatives and one
or more employers, if there is evidence that group legal services
plan benefits were the subject of good faith bargaining between
such employee representatives and such employer or employers.
(3) CONTRIBUTION LIMITATION-Not more than 25 percent
of the amounts contributed under the plan during the year may be
provided for the class of individuals who are shareholders or own-
ers (or their spouses or dependents), each of whom (on any day of
the year) owns more than 5 percent of the stock or of the capital
or profits interest in the employer.54
Compliance with these rules was (and continues to be) a "require-
ment" for "qualified group legal services plans" and the exclusion
from recipients' taxable income provided in section 120(a) applied
only to contributions made to, and benefits received from, a "quali-
fied group legal services plan." The penalty for failing to comply
with the nondiscrimination requirements was the loss of that exclu-
sion for recipients of benefits under the plan; all beneficaries of a
discriminatory plan had to include the entire value of their benefits
in their gross income.55
Congress included similar nondiscrimination rules in subse-
51 See supra note 32.
52 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-445, § 2134(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1926
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 120(c)).
53 Unless specifically identified otherwise, all references to "sections" contained
herein are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code.
54 I.R.C. § 120(c) (1985).
55 See I.R.C. §§ 120(a)-(b)(1977). Although the content of the nondiscrimination
rule has changed slightly since its original enactment, the penalty for violating the rule
remains the same.
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quent fringe benefit provisions. 56 Congress also added comparable
restrictions to preexisting fringe benefit exclusions such as health
benefits 57 and life insurance. 58 The coverage and contribution stan-
dards applicable to qualified pension plans59 were the model for
each of these rules. 60 Nevertheless, considerable differences existed
among the various fringe benefit nondiscrimination rules. 61 The
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (" 1986 Tax Act") 6 2 reduced or eliminated
some of these differences, but even after these changes become fully
effective,63 nondiscrimination rules will be far from uniform.
Like the pension plan rules, most of the fringe benefit nondis-
crimination rules evaluate fringe benefits in terms of the presence or
absence of discrimination in favor of a "suspect class" of "officers,
owners and highly compensated employees." 64 The rules look to
56 See Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, § 242(a), 92 Stat. 3174, 3193
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 124(c)); Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600,
§ 164(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2811 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 127(b)); Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 124(e)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 198-99 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 129(d)); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
§§ 531(a), 532, 98 Stat. 494, 877, 887 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 132(e)(2), (h)(1)
& 117 (d)(3)).
57 See Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
272, § 10001(b), 100 Stat. 82, 223 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 106(b)) (imposing
nondiscrimination rules on insured health plans); Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
600, § 366(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2855 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 105(h)) (imposing
nondiscrimination rule on employer-funded, uninsured medical reimbursement plans).
58 See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 244(a), 96 Stat. 324, 523-24 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 79(d)).
59 These standards, as amended, are set forth in I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(3)-(5) and 410(b).
60 Wiedenbeck, Nondiscrimination in Employee Benefits: False Starts and Future Trends, 52
TENN. L. REV. 167, 173 (1985).
61 Id.; compare I.R.C. § 127(b)(2)-(3) with I.R.C. § 105(h)(3)-(5). Both provisions
were enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763.
62 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 1114(b), 1151, 100 Stat.
2085, 2450, 2494. One aim of the 1986 legislation was the establishment of greater
uniformity between nondiscrimination rules. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 651
(1986). Especially because no one remembered the reasons for many of the differences
among similar statutory phrases and rules, retaining them seemed an unwarranted bur-
den on affected taxpayers. For a discussion of the changes effected by this Act, see infra
text accompanying notes 79-97, 124-45.
63 A number of the changes mandated by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 have delayed
effective dates. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1151(k), 100
Stat. 2085, 2508 (providing that amendments made by that section of the Act shall apply
to years beginning after the later of December 31, 1987 or the earlier of three months
after the promulgation of regulations necessary to carry out the new section 89 or De-
cember 31, 1988). The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 pospones
implementation of some of section 89's valuation rules until "testing years beginning
before the later ofJanuary 1, 1991, or the date one year after the Secretary of the Treas-
ury ... first issues such valuation rules as are necessary"; and provides simplified rules
to use in the interim. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-647, § 3021(c), 102 Stat. 3342, 3633-34.
64 I.R.C. § 132(h)(1). The linguistic contours of the suspect group, as well as the
technical definitions of the terms used, varied from statute to statute. Compare I.R.C.
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discrimination in terms of eligibility65 or participation 66 and
amounts of in-kind benefits distributed under the plan. Plans67
must be nondiscriminatory in terms of all three elements in order
§ 105 (h) (5) (1985) (forbidding discrimination in favor of "highly compensated individu-
als," who were one of the five highest paid officers, greater than 10% shareholders, or
the highest paid 25% of all employees) with I.R.C. § 79(d)(6) (forbidding discrimination
in favor of "key employees," defined as officers receiving more than $45,000 compensa-
tion, one of ten employees receiving more than $30,000 compensation and owning the
largest interests in the employer, a 5% owner, or a 1% owner earning more than
$150,000) and I.R.C. § 125(e)(1) (defining "highly compensated participant" as an of-
ficer, a more than 5% shareholder, highly compensated, or a spouse or dependent of
one of the above-listed individuals). See generally Wiedenbeck, supra note 60, at 184-85.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 replaced most of the phrases used in the fringe benefit
statutes with a single definition designed specifically to eliminate such variations. STAFF
OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
792 (1987) ("highly compensated employees as defined in I.R.C. § 414(q)") [hereinaf-
ter 1986 GENERAL EXPLANATION]. Section 79(d), however, continues to use the "key
employee" language. I.R.C. § 79(d).
65 An "eligible employee" is one entitled to participate in a fringe benefit program
or who would be so entitled if he or she fulfilled contingencies within his or her exclu-
sive control. Wiedenbeck, supra note 60, at 174-75. For example, an employee who
would receive employer-provided health insurance if he agreed to contribute $50 per
month towards the cost of the plan would be considered eligible to participate in such
plan. On the other hand, contingencies that are technically within an employee's con-
trol but require a considerable period of time to satisfy may render an employee "ineli-
gible." In regulations explaining "eligibility" in the context of educational assistance
programs, Treasury provides:
[I]f an employer's plan provides that all employees are eligible for educa-
tional assistance, yet limits that assistance to courses of study leading to
post-graduate degrees in fields relating to the employer's business, then
only those employees able to pursue such a course of study are consid-
ered actually eligible for educational assistance under the program.
Treas. Reg. § 1.127-2(e)(1)(1986).
66 An employee "participates" in a fringe benefit plan if he may receive a specific
item of in-kind compensation or reimbursement when the need arises. Wiedenbeck,
supra note 60, at 195. All "eligible employees" may be "participants" in a plan; how-
ever, if the plan requires eligible employees to satisfy a condition in order to become
eligible to receive benefits, only those employees satisfying such conditions will be
deemed "participants." Thus, if a firm provides an on-premise day care center for the
preschool children of any employee, all employees are participants, even those without
children. But if the facility is restricted to children of employees who have paid $500 per
year in advance, although all employees are "eligible employees," only those who con-
tribute $500 are "participants." Id.
67 The relevant statutes inevitably provide for the exclusion of benefits supplied
pursuant to a "plan" or "program" maintained by the employer. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§§ 105(h), 120(a). Although early commentators speculated that the requirement of a
"plan" might provide opportunities for Treasury and judicial regulation of such bene-
fits, see, e.g. Note, supra note 46, at 231-36, nothing much came from this language until
Congress enacted I.R.C. § 89(k) in 1986. This statute prescribes, for the first time, "cer-
tain basic standards" that a fringe benefit plan must satisfy in order to qualify for a
statutory exclusion. The plan must be in writing, employees' rights under it must be
legally enforceable, employees must have reasonable notification of any benefits avail-
able to them, the plan must operate for the exclusive benefit of the employees, and the
employer must have established the plan with the intent of continuing it indefinitely.
1986 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 64, at 811-12. Cf Bogene, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 730, 732-33 (1968) (holding under regulations then in force
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for all benefits to be assured fully nontaxable treatment. If a plan is
found to be discriminatory, some or all of the benefits become in-
cludable in recipients' income, and may therefore be less rather than
more desirable than cash salary equal to the cost of such benefits.68
a. Eligibility and Participation Tests.
First, plans must ensure that a sufficiently broad cross-section
of employees actually participate or are eligible to participate. The
breadth of participation required varies according to the type of
benefit and the employer involved. Prior to the 1986 Tax Act, the
most common "eligibility" provision required that "the plan shall
benefit employees who qualify under a classification set up by the
employer and found by the Secretary not to be discriminatory in
favor of employees who are" 69 members of the relevant suspect
group.70 In the absence of other, more explicit statutory stan-
dards, 71 conformity with this standard required that the proportion
of suspect group employees participating in a plan72 approximate
that a plan need not be in writing, employee's rights under it need not be enforceable,
and notice or knowledge of plan only needs to be "reasonably available" to employees).
68 The tax consequences of failing to meet discrimination tests vary with the type of
benefit involved. In some cases, all benefits distributed under the plan become taxable
to all recipients. See I.R.C. § 120(b)(2) (group legal services); I.R.C. § 124(c) (employer-
provided transportation); I.R.C. § 127(b) (educational assistance); I.R.C. § 129(d)(1)
(dependent care assistance). In other cases, such benefits become includable only for
highly compensated individuals. See I.R.C. § 79(d)(1) (group-term life insurance); I.R.C.
§ 125(a)(2) (cafeteria plans); I.R.C. § 132(h)(1) (no-additional-cost services and quali-
fied employee discounts). New section 89, following the pattern established in section
105(h) for uninsured medical reimbursement plans, provides that only the "excess bene-
fit" received by highly compensated employees will be included in income. I.R.C.
§ 89(a) (1) (applicable after the effective date, see supra note 63, to health plans, group life
insurance plans and, where elected by the employer, qualified group legal services plans,
educational assistance programs, and dependent care programs).
69 E.g., I.R.C. §§ 120(c)(2), 127(b)(2), 129(d)(3) (1985). See Wiedenbeck, supra
note 60, at 194.
70 See supra note 64.
71 Several fringe benefit statutes included more numerical coverage tests as an al-
ternative to this general discretionary test. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 79(d)(3)(A), 105(h)(3)(A)
(1985).
72 Although one could logically contend that no employee benefits from a fringe
benefit plan until he or she actually receives in-kind distributions, it is clear from a com-
bination of statutory language, regulations, and legislative explanations that employees
are deemed to benefit when the plan makes benefits available to them. See supra note 66.
For example, section 79(d)(3)(A) includes a mathematical test for group-term life insur-
ance that can only be satisfied if 707 of all employees "benefit" from the plan. See also
I.R.C. § 105(h)(3)(A)(i) (self-insured medical plan must "benefit" 70% or more of all
employees or 80% of eligible employees if 70% are eligible). As one commentator
points out, using such a liberal definition of "benefit" makes more sense in the context
of "insurance type benefits," where protection against an unlikely but calamitous event
is valuable in itself, than in the context of plans which protect against "the financial
consequences of events that are highly predictable" (e.g., child care). Wiedenbeck, supra
note 60, at 194-95. Nonetheless, except for the special rules applicable under the newly
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the proportion of the employer's other employees 73 participating.74
For example, a plan covering a mere 20% of the employer's total
work force (omitting excludable employees), where participants in-
cluded only 20% of the highly compensated employees would be
nondiscriminatory. A plan covering 20% of the work force where
participants included all highly compensated employees and only
about 2% of the other employees, however, would be
discriminatory. 75
Congress included bright line numerical tests as alternatives to
enacted section 89, see infra text accompanying notes 134-38, all the available evidence
points to the use of this liberal definition of "benefits" in the latter context as well. See,
e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.127-2(e)(1)(1986) ("... the classification of employees to be consid-
ered benefited [by an educational assistance program] will consist of that group of em-
ployees who are actually eligible for educational assistance under the program ... ");
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOV-
ERY TAX ACT OF 1981 55 (Comm. Print 1981) (to meet nondiscriminatory eligibility re-
quirement, dependent care assistance program "must be available to a broad class of
employees rather than to a particular individual").
73 The "other employees" group need not include all of the employer's nonhighly
compensated employees. Prior to the 1986 Tax Act, the list of excludable employees
differed from benefit to benefit, variously including, for example, part-time and seasonal
employees, I.R.C. §§ 79(d)(3)(B)(ii), 105(h)(3)(B)(iii) (1985); employees covered by a
collective bargaining agreement where evidence existed that the fringe benefit was the
subject of good faith bargaining, I.R.C. §§ 79(d)(3)(B)(iii), 105(h)(3)(B)(iv), 120(c)(2),
127(b)(2), 129(d)(3) (1985); and employees of less than three years duration, I.R.C.
§§ 79(d)(3)(B)(i), 105(h)(3)(B)(i), 125(g)(3)(B) (1985). Sometimes this group contained
more employees than the phrase suggested on its face; the term "employer" often in-
cluded not only the particular employment unit involved, but all trades or businesses
controlled by the same individuals or entities as the subject unit. I.R.C. §§ 125(g)(4),
105(h)(8), 79(d)(7); see Wiedenbeck, supra note 60, at 186 (discussing background of
expansive rule). As part of the 1986 Tax Act, Congress enacted uniform definitions of
"excluded employees" and "employers," standardizing the comparison group for all
fringe benefit plans, see 1986 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 64, at 782, just as it did
for the suspect group, see supra note 64. The new list of excludable employees includes
employees with less than one year of service (six months in the case of "core" health
benefits), employees who normally work less than 17.5 hours per week, employees who
normally work less than six months a year, employees under age 21, employees covered
by a collective bargaining agreement where the type of benefits provided by the plan was
the subject of good faith bargaining, and nonresident aliens receiving no United States
source income. I.R.C. § 89(h)(1). Once a plan covers any employee of a type excluda-
ble under the general rule, however, the exclusion for that type of employee ends.
I.R.C. § 89(h)(2)-(5). The statutory exclusions covering fringe benefits outside section
89's scope now incorporate by reference this definition of "excludable employee." See,
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 132(h)(1), 129(d)(3), 127(b)(2), 125(b)(3).
74 Regulations applicable to other types of fringe benefits incorporated this test
by reference. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.132-8T(c)(I), 1.127-2(e)(1), 1.105-11(c)(2)(ii)
(1986). The test initially appeared in regulations explaining the import of virtually iden-
tical language in the qualified pension plan rules, see I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B) (1986); Treas.
Reg. § 1.410(b)-l(d)(2) (promulgated in T.D. 7508, 1977-2 C.B. 124, amended by T.D.
7735, 1981-1 C.B. 217).
75 The regulation allows a "reasonable difference" between the coverage of the
suspect and comparison groups. Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-l(d)(2) (1986). The absence of
standards or guidelines for determining a "reasonable difference" has generated unfa-
vorable comment, see Wiedenbeck, supra note 60, at 194, and was proffered by Congress
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the more vaguely worded nondiscriminatory classification (really,
nondiscriminatory participation) standard in the statutes covering
life insurance and self-insured medical reimbursement plans.76 The
self-insured medical expense reimbursement test requires that
either the plan cover 70% of all employees, or that a plan for which
70%o of the work force is eligible cover 80% of eligible employees. 77
The group-term life insurance rule requires either 70% participa-
tion or that 85% of the insured employees not be "key
employees." 78
The 1986 Tax Act includes a new tripartite nondiscrimination
requirement. 79 Beginning in 1988 and 198980 the new test will be
imposed on all employer-provided health, accident, and group-term
life insurance plans, as well as such group legal services, educational
assistance, and dependent care assistance programs as an employer
elects. 8 ' Congress relied almost exclusively on numerical standards
when formulating the new test because it preferred the certainty nu-
merical formulas provided.82 Fringe benefit plans subject to the
new test must satisfy each of the three requirements described
below.
as one reason for adopting more numerically precise tests, see infra text accompanying
notes 83-97. See 1986 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 64, at 781.
76 See Wiedenbeck, supra note 60, at 191 & nn.80-81.
77 Taxpayers may disregard excludable employees when calculating each of these
percentages. I.R.C. § 105(h)(3). For a critique of this standard, see Wiedenbeck, supra
note 60, at 189-90.
78 I.R.C. § 79(d)(3)(A). For a definition of "key employee," see supra note 64.
79 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1151(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2494-
2502 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 89).
80 See supra note 63.
81 Section 89 includes certain amounts provided under "discriminatory employee
benefit plan[s]" in the gross income of highly compensated employees. I.R.C.
§ 89(a)(1). "Discriminatory employee benefit plans" are defined as any "statutory em-
ployee benefit plans" that fail to meet the requirements of section 89(d) and (e). I.R.C.
§ 89(c). "Statutory employee benefit plan" is a defined term encompassing (1) an acci-
dent or health plan within the meaning of section 105(e), (2) any plan of an employer
providing group-term life insurance within the meaning of section 79, and (3) a qualified
group legal services plan, an educational assistance program, or a dependent care assist-
ance program elected by the employer. I.R.C. § 89(i). Congress explained its decision
to treat educational assistance and group legal plans as statutory plans only on an elec-
tive basis by pointing out that their statutory basis will disappear entirely before section
89's nondiscrimination rules become effective and expressed a desire that they be cov-
ered by the new rules if such statutory authorization is extended beyond that date. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 508 (1986). Congress gave no reason
for its treatment of dependent care assistance plans-nor for its failure to allow other
types of benefit plans to be treated as "statutory" even on an elective basis. See id.
82 See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 769 (1985) (citing as "reasons for
change" of nondiscrimination rules that the old rules were "inconsistent and fail[ed] to
establish clear and administerable standards"); S. REP. No. 313, supra note 62, at 650
(citing as "reasons for change" of nondiscrimination rules that "little specific guidance
is provided as to whether a particular pattern of coverage discriminates in favor of pro-
hibited group members").
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The first prong of this tripartite eligibility test is that 90% of
nonhighly compensated employees83 be eligible to participate in the
same plan, or a plan of the same type,8 4 on terms that grant them an
employer-provided benefit 85 of at least half the value of that avail-
able to any highly compensated employee.8 6 For example, if the
most valuable benefit available to a highly compensated employee
under an employer's plan (or combination of plans) is $100, 90% of
the employer's nonhighly compensated workers must be eligible to
participate in a plan (or plans) providing $50 worth of the same ben-
efits. The test looks to the eligibility of employees to participate
rather than to actual participation rates. Thus, if the president of a
company is eligible to participate in health insurance plans which
together would provide $100 of employer-provided health insur-
ance coverage, 90% of the workers must be eligible to participate in
plans providing $50 of coverage-even if the president decides to
participate in the plans only up to a value of $70.87 Amounts of
available salary reduction 88 are generally ignored for purposes of
this test.8 9
83 The employer may exclude employees of the types listed in section 89(h), see
supra note 73, when determining the number of nonhighly compensated workers.
84 Plans which provide benefits excludable under the same section of the Code are
"of the same type." I.R.C. § 89(i)(3); 1986 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 64, at
783.
85 The statute values an "employer-provided benefit" according to "the value of
the coverage" in the case of group life and health insurance plans, I.R.C.
§ 89(g)(3)(A)(i), and "the value of the benefits" in the case of other types of plans.
I.R.C. § 89(g)(3)(A)(ii). Presumably, this means that if a health insurance plan offering
reimbursement of up to $250,000 in medical expenses costs $500 per year to provide,
an employee who would receive such coverage from her employer upon payment of a
$10 fee has $490 in employer-provided benefits available to her under the statute;
whereas an employee eligible to participate in a group legal services program under
which she could receive up to $1000 of legal services has $1000 of employer-provided
benefits available to her according to the statute. Yet the employer's ex ante cost of pro-
viding that benefit to her would be far less than $1000 since most participants in the
plan would not make use of the full $1000 of available legal services during the year (any
more than most of those covered under the health insurance plan would utilize all
$250,000 of available health insurance benefits). For further discussion of the meaning
of "employer-provided benefit," see infra text accompanying notes 134-38.
86 I.R.C. § 89(d)(1)(A).
87 As the president might do if contributions to the plan were a condition of receiv-
ing the additional $30 benefit.
88 Elective salary reductions may fund certain types of benefits.
89 I.R.C. § 89(g)(3)(D)(i). This almost has to be because, theoretically, employees
might elect to forgo their entire salaries in return for additional fringe benefits. Count-
ing available salary reduction amounts would thus cause any organization in which the
highest paid employee makes more than twice what the lowest paid employee earns to
fail the nondiscrimination test merely by offering a salary reduction option. Possibilities
for abuse of this exclusion led Congress, however, to enact two safeguards. First, the
second level utilization test includes salary reduction amounts. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 124-45 (discussing second level tests). Further, Congress provided that in
likely abuse situations, salary reduction amounts could be included even for purposes of
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In addition to meeting this "90/50 test," section 89 requires
that at least 50% of the employees eligible to participate in any par-
ticular plan be nonhighly compensated employees. 90 This second
prong, unlike the 90/50 test, applies to each plan.9 1 An employer
cannot, therefore, remedy one plan's failure to allow coverage of the
requisite number of rank and file employees by surpassing the 50%
rank and file standard under another plan. Because this test would
make it impossible for employers with large percentages of highly
compensated employees to offer nondiscriminatory fringe benefit
plans-even if equal coverage were available to all employees-
Congress enacted an alternative test for such employers. 92 This al-
ternative is essentially the numerical equivalent of the traditional
nondiscriminatory classification test.93 It requires that the percent-
age of nonhighly compensated employees eligible to participate in a
plan equal or exceed the percentage of highly compensated
eligibles. 94 Uniform eligibility would satisfy this formulation:
whether the employer's work force consists of 70% or 7% highly
compensated employees 100% of each group would be eligible to
participate, resulting in equal percentages for each group. Covering
20% of both the highly compensated and nonhighly compensated
employees would also satisfy this formulation. Unlike the generally
worded nondiscriminatory classification test, this new standard does
not allow the coverage of highly compensated employees to exceed
that of nonhighly compensated workers by a "reasonable differ-
ence." The bright line "equal or exceeds" standard penalizes any
deviation in coverage in favor of the suspect group.
The third and final prong of the new eligibility test disqualifies
any plan with provisions relating to eligibility which discriminate in
favor of highly compensated employees. 95 The exact scope of this
the 90/50 test. I.R.C. § 89(g)(3)(D)(ii)-(iii) (added by Technical and Miscellaneous Rev-
enue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 3021(a), 102 Stat. 3342, 3625-31). Even
without considering salary reduction amounts, determining the amount of benefits avail-
able to an employee may be very difficult-particularly when the employee's choice is
among alternatives rather than cumulative.
90 I.R.C. § 89(d)(1)(B).
91 To meet this requirement, exployers may aggregate "comparable health plans,"
(health plans under which the smallest employer-provided benefit available to any par-
ticipant is at least 95% of the largest employer-provided benefit available to any partici-
pant in either plan, see I.R.C. § 89(g)(1)(B), or, if both plans are available to the same
group of employees on the same terms, the cost to the employee of participating in
either does not vary by more than $100 annually, see I.R.C. § 89(g)(1)(E)). A somewhat
broader definition of comparability is used for purposes of the benefits tests contained
in section 89(f). See I.R.C. § 89(g)(1)(A)-(D).
92 See 1986 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 64, at 783.
93 This is the eligibility test described supra text accompanying notes 69-75.
94 I.R.C. § 89(d)(2).
95 I.R.C. § 89(d)(1)(C).
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requirement is far from clear. The Conference Report explains that the
test is not intended to disqualify arrangements where the discrimi-
nation is "quantifiable," such as where an employer maintains one
health plan for its salaried employees and another, of lesser value,
for its hourly employees.96 The Conference Report goes on to state,
however, that if a plan is designed to suit the highly individualized
needs of highly compensated employees, by providing unusual cov-
erage for a rare condition to which only the owner of the employer
is subject, such coverage may fail the third eligibility requirement
even if the coverage theoretically extends to all employees. 97
b. Benefits Tests.
Merely providing nonhighly compensated employees with the
opportunity to participate in a plan does not guarantee that they will
actually participate-let alone receive benefits equivalent to those of
highly paid employees. Nondiscriminatory eligibility requirements
can be meaningless if conditions on participation discourage eligible
rank and file employees from participating in the plan,98 limit bene-
fits offered to rank and file employees to a fraction of those offered
96 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 81, at pt. 2 at 510.
97 Id. Although the accompanying Congressional reports do not explain the dis-
tinction beyond providing the example cited above, Congress apparently wanted to iso-
late differences in the provision of separable benefits rather than distinctions that
permeate an entire plan (whatever those might be). This follows from Congress's defin-
ing "each option or different benefit offered under a statutory employee benefit plan...
as a separate plan." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 81, at pt. 2, at 529. That would
leave employers significant opportunities to avoid unfavorable tax treatment by
camouflaging the special coverage. Inasmuch as the Conference Committee has made
clear that taxpayers may structure options so as to pass the nondiscrimination test (even
though the same options structured differently would not), id., at pt. 2, at 530, the Ser-
vice may have difficulty in attacking such uses. Interestingly, the 1986 GENERAL EXPLA-
NATION suggests this prong of the eligibility test is a secondary check on the Secretary's
valuation tables, stating:
[a]nother example of a failure to satisfy the third eligibility test occurs if,
under the facts and circumstances, the employer is satisfying the other
nondiscrimination tests by providing or making available to nonhighly
compensated employees benefits that clearly have less value than that
ascribed to them under the Secretary's valuation tables....
1986 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 64, at 784. Although this description may be no
more than a slight generalization of the Conference Committee's example (i.e., where
the coverage has a high value for those with a particular disease and none at all for those
without it), it may overwhelm the benefits test, discussed infra text accompanying notes
124-45.
98 This problem arises, for example, if eligible employees need either to contribute
to the plan or to incur some other liability to become a "participant" in the plan. See
Wiedenbeck, supra note 60, at 195-96. Some "eligibility" requirements finesse this
problem by testing participation rather than eligibility. See, e.g., supra text accompanying
notes 70-75. Depending on how broadly section 89(d)(1)(C) is interpreted, its eligibility
test may look only at eligibility, disregarding participation.
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to highly compensated employees, 99 or provide benefits only upper
income employees are likely to want or need.100 For this reason,
many nondiscrimination rules contain a second level of protection
for lower paid employees: they require distribution of benefits in a
nondiscriminatory fashion. Like the eligibility or coverage tests,
these "benefits" tests come in a variety of forms.
Several statutes merely provide that any benefits available to
highly compensated employees must be available to all partici-
pants.' 0 ' Sometimes they require that benefits be available on the
same terms.' 0 2 This requirement, like some of the more elaborate
coverage requirements, prevents dejure discrimination against lower
level employees. It provides no impediment, however, to de facto
discrimination arising from differences in the utilization rates of up-
per and highly and nonhighly paid employees (reflecting differing
tastes and/or needs). 103 For example, an employer with a sickly ex-
ecutive and two, twenty-five year old file clerks could meet the literal
demands of this requirement by providing each of its employees
with a health insurance policy covering $250,000 of medical ex-
penses. The executive would reap a much larger economic benefit
from the coverage than the nonhighly compensated file clerks. 10 4
Apparently, an employer could even run a study to decide which
benefits were most desired by its executives, and then provide those
benefits to the entire work force with the expectation (if not hope)
that most of the rank and file would never take advantage of the
benefits.10 5
The most common form of benefits testing, the concentration
99 Again, some of the "eligibility" requirements take care of this problem. E.g.,
I.R.C. § 89(d)(1) (A) (ii) (requiring lower paid employees be eligible for benefits worth at
least 50% of highest benefit available to highly compensated employees). Many, how-
ever, only require provision of some benefit to a nondiscriminatory set of employees.
E.g., I.R.C. §§ 79(d)(3)(A), 105(h)(3)(A), 129(d)(3).
100 The most extreme forms of this abuse in "statutory employee benefit plan[s]"
may be curtailed by operation of section 89(d)(1)(C). See supra text accompanying notes
95-97. Even when it takes effect, however, section 89 will only apply to certain types of
plans. See supra text accompanying note 81. None of the older eligibility rules provides
even the minimal protection of section 89(d)(1)(C). See supra note 72; see also
Wiedenbeck, supra note 60, at 194-199 (arguing that coverage requirements are insuffi-
cient safeguards against discriminatory plan utilization).
101 See I.R.C. §§ 79(d)(4), 105(h)(4). In addition, section 79 has a nonegalitarian
definition of the same benefits. An employer cannot fail the nondiscriminatory benefits
test as long as it makes insurance coverage equal to the same multiple of salary available
to each employee. I.R.C. § 79(d)(5).
102 See I.R.C. §§ 117(d)(3), 132(e)(2), 132(h)(1).
103 Unless, of course, it is accompanied by another limitation which has this effect.
See infra text accompanying notes 106-12.
104 This would probably be the case regardless of whether one assesses the value of
the benefit in terms of the cost of coverage provided or actual reimbursements.
105 Wiedenbeck, supra note 60, at 222.
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test, provides some protection against this type of defacto discrimi-
nation. For example, section 120(c) (3)106 limits distributions to cer-
tain owner-employees 10 7 under a plan to a specified percentage of
the total payments made under the plan.'0 8 Unlike the coverage
tests, this test looks at the amounts actually received by (or paid out
on behalf of) each participant under the plan and not the amount
that may be received or the cost of coverage provided by the
plan. 0 9 Of course, the impact of these limitations differs considera-
bly depending on the size and composition of the affected work
force,"1 the definition of the suspect group,"' and the percentage
limitation. "1 2
Both the concentration and the equal availability tests may be
accompanied by a general requirement that "[t]he contributions or
106 Quoted in full supra text accompanying note 54.
107 Often, disbursements to highly salaried employees are ignored and the limita-
tions fall only on disbursements to 5% owners or some other "super-suspect" group.
See infra note 108 (detailing statutes).
108 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 120(c)(3) (limiting contributions made on behalf of 5% owners
or their spouses and dependents to 25% of total contributions); I.R.C. § 125(b)(2) (key
employees must not receive more than 25% of the aggregate qualified benefits distrib-
uted pursuant to plan); I.R.C. § 127(b)(3) (no more than 5% of amount paid by em-
ployer for educational assistance may be provided to 5% owners or their spouses or
dependents); I.R.C. § 129(d)(4) (amounts incurred by employer for dependent care
assistance on behalf of 5% owners limited to 25 percent of aggregate expenditures).
109 The language of most of the statutes makes this result crystal clear and the regu-
lations proposed under the only statute with somewhat ambiguous language, section
120(c), mandate the same interpretation. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.120-2(f)(3)(i)-(ii), 45
Fed. Reg. 28,360 (1980) which stated:
no legal service may be provided to a member of the limitation class if to
provide the service would cause the fair market value of legal services
provided to date during the plan year to members of the limitation class
to exceed 25% of the fair market value of the legal services provided
under the plan to date....
Id. The language continued, "The extent to which members of the limitation class, as a
class, utilize plan benefits shall be taken into account in determining the percentage of
amounts contributed by the employer that is considered contributed on behalf of the
limitation class .. " Id. at § 1.120-2(f)(5)(i).
110 The higher the percentage of highly compensated employees or 5% owner-em-
ployees in the employer's work force, the more these restrictions bite. For example, if
only 1% of the work force consists of owner-employees, each may receive 25 times the
dependent care assistance provided rank and file employees without running afoul of
the applicable limitation, while if 50% of the employees are also owners, each can re-
ceive (on average) only half the assistance provided the other employees if the plan is to
meet the statutory requirement. Small businesses, which are more likely to have a sub-
stantial percentage of owner-employees, are thus more adversely affected by such re-
quirements than large businesses. See Hall, Operation of Group Legal Services Plan Not Clear:
Additional Guidelines Needed, 46J. TAx. 108, 109 (1977).
111 Five percent owners are likely to be a smaller percentage of the work force than
"highly compensated" employees-particularly because the statutory definition of the
latter generally includes the former. See supra note 64.
112 The 25% limitation found in most of the relevant statutes is considerably more
generous than the 5% cap in section 127(b)(3).
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benefits provided under the plan shall not discriminate" in favor of
highly placed or highly paid employees.1 13 This language, drawn
directly from the pension plan nondiscrimination rules, 114 is often
meaningless in the fringe benefit context. Under most such plans,
employees do not have individual accounts to which the employer
makes contributions. 15 Moreover the amount of benefits "pro-
vided" could be measured by the value of those made available to
participants, or by those actually received by each individual.
In the Treasury's sole attempt to explain the operation of this
nondiscriminatory benefits rule in the context of the provision of
legal services, 116 it states that differential utilization rates may be
evidence of discrimination:
Not only must a plan not discriminate on its face in employer con-
tributions or plan benefits in favor of employees who are officers,
shareholders, self-employed or highly compensated, or their
spouses or dependents, the plan also must not discriminate in
favor of such employees, or their spouses or dependents, in actual
operation. Accordingly, the extent to which such employees, or
their spouses or dependents, as a group, utilize plan benefits must
be compared to the extent to which all other employees, or their
spouses or dependents, as a group, utilize plan benefits .... [A]
persistent pattern of greater relative utilization of plan benefits by
the group of employees who are officers, shareholders, self-em-
ployed or highly compensated, or their spouses or dependents,
may be evidence that the plan discriminates in favor of such em-
ployees and is not for the benefit of employees generally.' 17
The same proposed regulation also provides, "[t]he extent to which
members of the limitation class, as a class, utilize plan benefits shall
be taken into account," ' 18 for purposes of determining whether the
amount of contributions "on behalf of"119 the suspect class exceeds
the allowable amount.' 20 Whether Treasury or the courts should or
113 See I.R.C. §§ 120(c)(1), 129(d)(2), 105(h)(2)(B) (benefits only). See also I.R.C.
§ 125(b)(1)(B) (amended by 1986 Tax Reform Act). Cf I.R.C. § 79(d)(2)(B) ("the type
and amount of benefits available under the plan do not discriminate .. ") (emphasis
added). For discussion of the ambiguities inherent in the term "benefits," see supra note
72.
114 See I.R.C. § 401(a)(4).
115 See Wiedenbeck, supra note 60, at 218-19. Indeed, if what is being provided is
group insurance, the employer may have no way of knowing the premium payable with
respect to a given employee.
116 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.120-2(e)(3), supra note 109.
117 Id. § 1.120-2(e)(3)(ii).
118 Id. § 1.120-2(f)(5)(i).
119 Id.
120 The concentration test for group legal services plans limits the amounts "con-
tributed under the plan" that "may be provided for the class" of 5% owner-employees.
I.R.C. § 120(c)(3). The proposed regulations separately describe these amounts, but do
not necessarily differentiate them from "contributions" for purposes of the more gen-
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would take the same approach when examining a plan providing
benefits other than legal services remains uncertain because of the
unique wording of the legal services statute.
Congress explicitly (and uniquely)' 2 ' provided in the statute,
"[a]llocations of amounts contributed under the plan shall.. . take
into account the expected relative utilization of benefits to be pro-
vided from such contributions."'' 22 Moreover, no attempt has yet
been made to quantify "a persistent pattern of greater relative utili-
zation."' 123 Thus, even if the method of allocation could be decided
upon, the ultimate consequences of the allocations would still be in
doubt.
Congress attempted to eliminate both of these ambiguities or
defects from the latest version of the benefits test, codified in sec-
tion 89. In essence, the new benefits test is just a more precise ver-
sion of the nondiscriminatory benefits rule described above. It
mandates that "the average employer-provided benefit received by
[non-highly compensated] employees" from all plans of the same
type' 24 equal at least 75% of the "average employer-provided bene-
fit received by highly compensated employees" under such plans. 125
The statute defines "average employer-provided benefit" as a frac-
tion, the numerator of which is "an amount equal to... the aggre-
gate employer-provided benefits received by" the category of
employees being tested, 126 and the denominator of which is the
number of employees in that category.' 27
All employees are included within a category (and thus the de-
nominator of the fraction), whether or not covered under any such
plan, 128 unless specifically excluded by statute.129 In addition to the
eral nondiscrimination test. Compare Prop. Trea. Reg. § 1.120-2(e), supra note 109 with
id. § 1.120-2(f).
121 No other fringe benefit statute contains such a provision. On the other hand, no
fringe benefit statute explicitly provides that utilization rates cannot be considered when
testing for discrimination. Two statutes provide that utilization rates for different types
of assistance made available under a program are not grounds for finding discrimina-
tion, see I.R.G. §§ 127(c)(5)(A), 129(e)(6), but those provisions are integration rules,
which allow the nondiscrimination test to be satisfied by aggregating utilization rates for
different types of assistance in a given program, rather than making all utilization rates
irrelevant. In fact, it is logical to conclude, as does one commentator, that these provi-
sions imply by negation that "participants' relative total utilization of all items of in-kind
compensation available under the plan is relevant to the amount nondiscrimination
test." Wiedenbeck, supra note 60, at 225. But see supra note 72.
122 I.R.C. § 120(d)(3).
123 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.120-2(e)(3)(ii), supra note 109.
124 For a definition of "plans of the same type," see supra note 84.
125 I.R.C. § 89(e)(1).
126 The two relevant groups are highly compensated and nonhighly compensated
employees. See I.R.C. § 89(e)(2).
127 Id.
128 I.R.C. § 89(e)(2)(B).
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general statutory exclusions, section 89 allows employers to elect
two additional exclusions for purposes of applying this benefits test
to health insurance plans. First, the employer may disregard any
employee who (together with spouse and dependents) receives
"core benefits"13 0 under another employer's health plan.13' Sec-
ond, employers may elect to test health benefits provided spouses
and dependents of employees separately from those provided indi-
vidual employees. If they do so elect, they may ignore those em-
ployees with a spouse and/or dependents who are covered by
another employer's core benefits health plan and employees with
neither spouses nor dependents when testing spouse/dependent
benefits 132 for discrimination. 133
The numerator of each fraction contains the sum of the
amounts of employer-provided benefits distributed to the employ-
ees in the category over the taxable year. Computing this number,
of course, requires being able to ascertain the value or amount of
benefits provided to each employee. Section 89 explains how to do
this; the methods it provides differ depending on whether the bene-
fit at issue is health or group-term life insurance, or some other ben-
efit. In the case of health or group-term life insurance, the amount
of the benefit is "the value of the coverage"; 13 4 for other types of
129 See I.R.C. § 89(h); see also supra note 73 (describing exclusions).
130 Although the statute does not define the term, in its explanation of the 1986 Tax
Act, the Joint Committee staff describes "coverage for dental, vision, psychological and
orthodontia expenses and elective cosmetic surgery" as "noncore accident and health
benefits." 1986 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 64, at 799.
131 I.R.C. § 89(g)(2)(A)(i).
132 I.R.C. § 89(g)(2)(A)(ii). But see I.R.C. § 89(g)(2)(E) (limiting exclusion of
nonhighly compensated employees to plans providing immediate election of coverage
for change of circumstances such as loss of other coverage or marriage.
133 An employer electing to use either of these exclusions must maintain "sworn
statements" by employees of their marital and coverage status. I.R.C. § 89(g)(2)(B).
Large employers may meet this requirement through the use of as yet largely unex-
plained "valid sampling techniques." These techniques must be approved by Treasury
subject to the minimum standards established by Congress in the Technical and Miscel-
laneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 3021(a)(3), 102 Stat. 3342 (to be
codified at I.R.C. § 89(g)(7 )). In the absence of written statements, the Code treats each
highly compensated employee of electing employers as if covered by another employer's
plan and without a spouse and dependents. The opposite assumptions apply to a
nonhighly compensated employee. I.R.C. § 89(g)(2)(C).
134 I.R.C. § 89(g)(3)(A)(i). The statute also explains how to derive the value of
"coverage." For example, in valuing health insurance, section 89 provides procedures
prescribed by the Secretary ".... shall-(i) set forth the values of various standard types
of coverage involving a representative group, and (ii) provide for adjustments to take
into account the specific coverage and group involved." I.R.C. § 89 (g)(3)(B). (Inas-
much as Treasury has been unable to issue these figures, Congress postponed the effec-
tive date of this valuation standard to "the later ofJanuary 1, 1991, or the date I year
after the Secretary... first issues such valuation rules .... " See Technical and Miscella-
neous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 3021(c)(1), 102 Stat. 3342, 3363. In
the meantime, employers may select "any other reasonable method." Id.) This method,
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plans, it is "the value of the benefits."' 135 The juxtaposition of "the
value of the coverage" and "the value of the benefits" suggests that
the two phrases mean different things-specifically, that the term
"benefits" in this context refers to only those payments made to or
on behalf of an employee under the plan.
In prior eligibility and (perhaps) nondiscriminatory benefits
rules, the same word referred to the cost of making such benefits
available in the event a need arose. 136 Congress could not have in-
tended the old meaning here because the phrase "the value of the
benefits" would mean the same thing as "the value of the coverage"
and Congress had no reason for providing two separate definitions
of "employer-provided benefit." To make sense of the dual defini-
tion, then, we must interpret the term "benefits" more narrowly to
include only utilized opportunities. The fact that, as part of the
same act, Congress added a similar benefits test to the exclusion for
dependent care assistance supports the argument for this interpre-
tation of "benefits." When describing this new addition to the de-
pendent care statute, the Joint Committee Staff noted, "[t]his
benefits test was intended to apply notwithstanding the provision
providing that utilization rates cannot cause a dependent care assist-
ance program to fail to qualify."' 13 7 Because the dependent care
benefits test is "the same benefits test applicable to statutory em-
ployee benefits plans .. .with two modifications,"' 3 8 it stands to
however, only leads to the assignment of a value to all the coverage provided under a
plan (a figure which most employers could derive rather easily by looking up their insur-
ance premiums!) and not the value of each individual's coverage (a figure needed when-
ever a plan covers some highly compensated and some nonhighly compensated
individuals, unless, although nominally members of one plan, the different employee
groups should be treated as receiving benefits under two different plans for valuation
purposes). One possibility is that each individual's benefit under a plan would be equal
to the total cost divided by the number of employees covered by the plan. Although
understating the value of coverage provided less healthy employees, this method is con-
sistent with the rule provided for valuing group-term life insurance benefits. That rule
states that "in determining the value of coverage under a group-term life insurance plan,
the amount taken into account ... shall be based on the cost of the insurance deter-
mined under section 79(c) for an employee who is age 40." I.R.C. § 89(g)(3)(C). Of
course, this allocation method fails to prevent the "abuse" described supra text accompa-
nying notes 104-05.
135 I.R.C. § 89(g)(3)(A)(ii).
136 See supra note 72 (eligibility) and text accompanying notes 113-21 (benefits).
137 1986 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 64, at 810 n.12. The footnote also
points out that "[a] technical correction may be needed so that the statute reflects this
intent." Id. This correction was included in the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1011B(a)(15)(B), 102 Stat. 3342, 3485 (to be codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 129(d)(7)(B)).
Note that both the Staff and Congress interpret section 129(e)(6) as forbidding any
sort of utilization test, despite the narrower reading (described supra note 121) sug-
gested by its carefully limited language.
138 1986 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 64, at 810.
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reason that the statutory employee benefits benefit test takes actual
utilization and not mere coverage into account.
The new benefits test allows employers one additional option.
Instead of computing the average employer-provided benefit for
each type of plan, employers may elect to compute a single average
employer-provided benefit for all of their "statutory fringe benefit
plans" taken together. 39 Thus, benefits provided employees under
one type of plan may overcome deficiencies in the average em-
ployer-provided benefit provided nonhighly compensated employ-
ees under another type of plan. However, because meeting section
89's benefits test does not excuse "elective" statutory fringe benefit
plans from the requirement of fulfilling any applicable concentra-
tion of benefits test,' 40 and because too gross a disparity in the dis-
tribution of benefits may cause a plan to fail the applicable
concentration test,' 41 the allowance of aggregation for purposes of
section 89's benefits test may not save plans from unfavorable tax
treatment.
Finally, section 89 provides an alternative test so employers
may avoid both its general benefits test and the first two parts of its
tripartite eligibility test. 142 Under this alternative test, the nondis-
criminatory nature of health and life insurance plans is established if
the plan 43 covers 80% of the nonhighly compensated employees
and avoids any eligibility provision which (by its terms or otherwise)
139 I.R.C. § 89(g)(4)(A). For a list of benefit plans falling within the definition of
"statutory employee benefit plans," see supra note 81. Apparently, an employer can
aggregate a subset of its statutory fringe benefit plans for testing purposes, leaving the
remainder to be tested in a separate computation. Once it elects to aggregate one plan
providing benefits excludable under a particular Code section, however, it must aggre-
gate all of its plans providing benefits excludable under that Code section. See 1986
GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 64, at 806-07.
Health plans, however, must meet the benefits test by themselves to qualify as non-
discriminatory. I.R.C. § 89(g)(4)(B). After establishing their nondiscriminatory status,
the taxpayer may aggregate the value of all benefits provided under health plans with
the value of benefits provided under other types of plans to determine whether the other
plans are discriminatory. 1986 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 64, at 806-07. This is
not always advantageous because the special exclusions applicable to health plans, see
supra text accompanying notes 130-33, disappear when testing such plans along with
other plans. 1986 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 64, at 807. Thus, because of the
variable definitions of "excludable employees," the combined plans may fail nondis-
crimination tests which either type of plan could pass individually.
140 I.R.C. § 89(j)(7).
141 See supra text accompanying notes 106-12 (discussing operation of various con-
centration tests).
142 I.R.C. § 89(f).
143 The Code provides special rules for allowing, and in certain cases requiring, the
aggregation of health plans for benefits testing purposes. See I.R.C. §§ 89(g)(3) &
(g)(1)(D). See also supra note 91 (describing general allowance of aggregation of"compa-
rable" health plans).
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discriminates in favor of highly compensated employees. 144 This
simple test, designed for use by small employers,1 45 like the other
benefits tests applicable to health and group-term insurance plans,
ignores the possibility that identical benefits may have substantially
different economic consequences for different recipients.
Though nondiscrimination rules in the fringe benefit area are
far from perfect (in terms of taxpayers' knowing what they must do
to comply with them), it appears that some of the nondiscrimination
rules applicable to the fringe benefit sections of the Code may
achieve Congress's intended effect. They will require employers
who hope to obtain favorable tax treatment for highly compensated
employees' benefits to provide benefits of similar economic value to
their lower paid employees. The specification of necessary defini-
tions, the clarification of ambiguous terms, and above all, the provi-
sion of bright line standards for the identification of discriminatory
programs will all combine to make compliance and enforcement
possible. In short, the restrictions may actually restrict some em-
ployers' freedom to act as they might wish. But now that nondis-
crimination rules will begin to have some bite, it is time to ask what
behavior the Code will be encouraging and why. The answers to
these questions are not as straightforward as one might wish.
B. The Trickle-Up Effect
Employers can provide very few fringe benefits at no cost, 146
and many of the most common fringes are quite expensive. 147
Although an altruistic employer may be willing to incur such costs
on top of its ordinary compensation expenses, an ordinary employer
must offset the cost of such fringes against employees' cash
wages. 148 Indeed, from the economic perspective of an employer, a
fringe benefit plan is a needless expense unless employees are will-
ing to give up enough cash salary to cover the cost of the plan.
144 I.R.C. § 89(f).
145 189 DAILY TAX REP. G-5 (Oct. 1, 1987).
146 Even those fringe benefits which fall within section 132(b)'s definition of a "no-
additional-cost-service" (and which are, therefore, excluded from income under section
132(a)) are costless only when viewed from the narrowest possible perspective. See
Note, Federal Income Taxation of Employee Fringe Benefits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1162-63 &
nn.100-05 (1976).
147 The two most common fringe benefits are life and health insurance. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. 2281, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM
AND LARGE FIRMS, 1986 27 (1987) (health care benefits provided to 957o and life insur-
ance to 96%5 of employees in large and medium size firms) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE BENE-
FITS IN MEDIUM AND SMALL FIRMS]. For those employees receiving coverage, the median
cost for health insurance approximated $1265 (net of administrative costs). Id. at 15, 3 1.
148 Adamache & Sloan, Fringe Benefits: To Tax Or Not To Tax?, 38 NAT'L TAXJ. 47, 60
(1985); Halperin & Tzur, The Effects of Nontaxable Employee Benefits on Employer Profits and
Employee Work Effort, 38 NAT'L TAXJ. 65, 75 (1985).
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Otherwise the plan increases the employer's total labor cost and de-
creases profits. For example, if employees would work for $1000 in
cash or $950 plus a given amount of health insurance, it would make
economic sense for an employer to provide the health insurance
only if it could do so for $50 or less.149
1. The Incidence of a Tax Subsidy
The exclusion of fringe benefits from taxable income makes
employees relatively more likely to agree to such trades because it
makes fringe benefits appear cheaper than they are in market
terms.' 50 In order for the trade to be worthwhile, the benefit only
needs to be worth more to the employee than the forgone cash sal-
ary reduced by the applicable tax. For example, the real choice for
an employee in a fifteen percent tax bracket who is deciding be-
tween health insurance and $100 in cash salary is between the health
insurance and $85. The health insurance is obviously more attrac-
tive once tax considerations are taken into account (though it might
not look like a good trade to the employee in either case).
In the absence of a nondiscrimination rule, the tax subsidy' 5'
149 Exactly how thrilled an employer will be depends on how much of the savings it
can direct to its own benefit and how much will remain with the employee as a defacto
bonus. The only way the employer can realize a direct cost savings, however, is if it can
figure out how much the benefit is worth to the various employees and subtract that
value from their wages. The valuation task is not an easy one. The employees them-
selves are often unable to determine the value of such benefits because of uncertainty as
to the actual amount provided or inability to consider in isolation one component of an
overall wage package. Even when employees can assess a benefit, they have an incentive
to misrepresent their calculation in hopes of negotiating a better deal with the employer.
See Popkin, The Taxation of Employee Fringe Benefits, 22 B.C.L. REV. 439, 448-49 (1981).
Moreover, even with perfect information, an employer may have difficulty reducing em-
ployees' salaries by as much as the benefit's value. See id. at 451-52. In most cases,
therefore, an employer is unlikely to retain the entire differential for itself. Id. at 452.
On the other hand, letting the worker retain some of the differential has offsetting ad-
vantages for the employer. See Halperin & Tzur, supra note 148, at 75. For example, it
may raise employee morale and induce employees to work harder.
Of course, any extra profits generated by the reduction in labor costs would be
subject to income tax. This additional tax liability is not a "tax disadvantage," however.
Although the employer's taxes would be higher than the taxes due if the employee re-
tained the differential, the employer is still better off by the amount of the differential
minus the extra tax obligation.
150 See Katz & Mankiw, How Should Fringe Benefits Be Taxed?, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 37, 38
(1985); Adamache & Sloan, supra note 148, at 47. After running an empirical study, one
commentator argued that, while statistically significant, the effect of tax favoritism on
the amount of fringe benefits provided is relatively low. He projects that eliminating the
various exclusions entirely would only cause about a 25% drop in the amount of fringe
benefits provided. Turner, Are Taxes Responsible for the Growth in Fringe Benefits?, 40 NAT'L
TAxJ. 205, 215 (1987).
151 When Congress declines to tax certain forms of compensation, it clearly subsi-
dizes them. "In effect, the federal government is paying a portion of the employee's
wages in order to encourage the employer to provide certain types of benefits to the
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can accrue to three parties: the employee receiving the benefit, the
employer providing the benefit, and the suppliers of the benefit.
Employees can benefit whenever the value of the exclusion exceeds
the difference between their employer's cost of providing the bene-
fit and their subjective valuation' 52 of its worth (i.e., it exceeds the
amount necessary to persuade the employee to forfeit the requisite
cash salary in exchange for insurance coverage). Take, for example,
an employee in a 15%o tax bracket whose subjective valuation of
$100 of health insurance is $90. Absent a tax benefit, the employee
would not agree to trade enough cash for the insurance so that the
employer could not recoup his expenses and thus would not
purchase the insurance. A government bonus of $10.01 for choos-
ing insurance would suffice, however, to alter the employee's prefer-
ences in favor of the insurance. Because the Treasury forgives the
$15 tax on the $100 of insurance rather than providing a bonus of
$10.01, the employee gains-and the Treasury loses-an extra 53
$4.99 as a result of engaging in the trade. 154
The employee retains this extra $4.99 only if his employer does
not capitalize on it. The employer may try to appropriate some or
all of the subsidy for its own benefit by requiring the employee to
give up more cash salary to engage in the trade than that necessary
to cover the employer's expense of providing insurance. 155 The em-
employees." Testimony ofJohn E. Chapoton, Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy before the
Senate Finance Committee, reprinted in 19-13 TAX NoTEs 1191, 1191 (1983) [hereinafter
Chapoton Testimony]. The amount of lost tax revenues is quite large; estimates of lost
income tax alone total around $29 billion (in 1979 dollars). Turner, supra note 150, at
215; see also Adamache & Sloan, supra note 148, at 54 (estimating 1980 revenue loss at
about $23.6 billion). Of course, increasing the tax rates applicable to taxable income
may have recouped much of this "lost" revenue (in other words, if Congress repeals the
exclusions it may use the increase in revenues to reduce rates rather than the deficit),
exacerbating the distortions caused by the exclusions. See Kosters & Steuerle, supra note
26, at 90-91.
152 Employees benefit to the extent of the difference between the after tax value of
their entire compensation package (wages and benefits) with the tax exclusion and the
after tax value of the compensation without the exclusion. It is possible to calculate the
employees' benefits by estimating the market value of the benefits. However, not all
employees value the fringes as the market does. The formula contained in the text thus
more accurately represents the value of the exclusion from an employee's perspective.
See Clotfelter, supra note 26, at 52; but see Yorio, Equity, Efficiency and the Tax Reform Act of
1986, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 395, 445 n.358 (1987)(arguing that interpersonal utility dif-
ferences should be ignored).
153 The "extra" is the amount the Treasury loses in excess of the amount necessary
to entice the employee to trade cash salary for the fringe benefit.
154 The amount of the "wasted" tax subsidy is uncertain, because, in the absence of
a set of compensation packages designed in a world without a tax subsidy, there is no
alternative for comparison. The most recent published study, however, suggests that
the subsidy "is not a cost-effective means to employ." Turner, supra note 150, at 215.
155 See Lubick Testimony, supra note 22, at 26. Of course, the employer may decide
it could benefit more from the increased productivity generated by a better paid, hap-
pier employee. See Halperin & Tzur, supra note 148, at 75.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ployer could demand that the employee give up $105 in cash salary
to receive health insurance, for instance, and reduce its labor costs
by $5. The employee would agree to this trade because he values
the health insurance more than the $89.25 left after paying 15%
income tax on the $105. Of course, the employer's gain is the em-
ployee's loss; this trade would leave the employee only $.74 of the
surplus. 156 Finally, fringe benefit suppliers are likely to benefit, at
least in the short run from the exclusion, because it increases de-
mand for their products and enables them to sell more units or to
raise their prices. 157
Even the federal government may benefit from the arrange-
ment, because it might have to provide health benefits if employers
do not. The process of designing a public delivery system, to say
nothing of raising the revenue to support it, might be more difficult,
expensive, or unpleasant for the government than for employers.
Even an admittedly defective tax subsidy system, therefore, may be
better from the government's perspective. 5 8
Not everyone benefits from the tax subsidy, however. The
clearest losers are employees who receive relatively few fringe bene-
fits from their employers, either because their employers do not of-
fer them benefits or because they decline available benefits. These
employees pay tax on a higher proportion of their total compensa-
tion than employees who receive part of their income in the form of
fringe benefits. Their tax burden is, therefore, disproportionately
high. 159
156 Undoubtedly, employers appropriate some portion of the subsidy; no one ap-
pears to believe, however, that employers take it all. E.g., Halperin & Tzur, supra note
148, at 75; Yorio, supra note 152, at 445. See also Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retire-
ment Security and Tax Policies, 135 PA. L. REv. 851, 880 (1987) (discussing tradeoff of pen-
sion tax benefits). Some of the reasons for this splitting of the benefit are discussed
supra note 149. Note that employer appropriation of the benefit solves neither the lost
revenue problem, discussed supra note 151, nor the horizontal inequality problem.
Although additional profits generated by the appropriation would be taxable, the reve-
nue raised would be at most 34% (the highest marginal tax rate) of the forgone reve-
nues (since the base for assessing the tax would be only the tax revenue forgone rather
than the amount excluded from income). Likewise, although no employee would be
favored if the tax benefit were "competed away," employers able to provide such bene-
fits would be favored relative to other employers because of their lower labor costs. See
Lubick Testimony, supra note 22, at 26; Ferguson, Income Tax Treatment of Employee Fringe
Benefits, 74 NTA-TIA 97, 98 (1981).
157 Although commentators have investigated the relationship between the exclu-
sion of employer-provided health insurance from income and the rise in health care
costs extensively, research has lead to more questions than answers. See, e.g., Adamache
& Sloan, supra note 148, at 56-57, Feldstein, supra note 26, at 253-55; Kosters &
Steuerle, supra note 26, at 90.
158 See Lubick Testimony, supra note 22, at 26 (some fringe benefits have "a social
welfare purpose"); Adamache & Sloan, supra note 148, at 48.
159 This result is particularly evident (though no more true) if one assumes Congress
raises tax rates to recoup tax revenues lost to the various fringe benefit exclusions. For
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A disproportionate number of employees receiving below-aver-
age fringe benefits are relatively poor.160 Several reasons exist for
this disparity. One reason is quite obvious: the poorer the individ-
ual, the more likely he is to need cash rather than fringe benefits
(which usually are nontransferable). To take an extreme example,
consider what would happen if an employee working for compensa-
tion just above the minimum wage (and with little or no income
from other sources) were asked whether he would trade some cash
salary for legal insurance. Such a trade would involve a gain of legal
insurance but, almost surely, the loss of the means to purchase ade-
quate amounts of food.161 The lower an employee's income the less
likely he is to value fringe benefits as highly as the items he could
purchase with cash. 162 In the face of such a valuation differential an
employee will not voluntarily agree to trade cash for fringe benefits.
By contrast, the higher an individual's income, the more likely he is
to think a trade is worthwhile. High income individuals have
enough discretionary income to invest in, and often have acquired a
taste for, benefits such as legal insurance, life insurance, and health
insurance. Especially if the terms offered by employers compare fa-
vorably to those employees could obtain themselves, as they often
will,163 trading cash salary for fringes is an attractive option for
these employees.
The difference in the willingness of employees at different in-
come levels to trade cash salary for fringe benefits is exacerbated by
the tax subsidy for fringe benefits. The progressive rate structure of
example, suppose Congress increases marginal tax rates from 24%o to 28%o to avoid a
shortfall of revenue because taxpayers, on average, receive 16%o of their compensation
in the form of tax free fringe benefits. Instead of receiving $1000 and incurring a $240
income tax liability, the average taxpayer is treated as receiving $840 and pays $235 in
taxes. Taxpayers who receive all $1000 in cash, however, end up with a tax liability of
$280-or $45 more than the "average" similarly well paid taxpayer. The detriment to
taxpayers who do not prefer tax-favored goods occurs not only in the context of fringe
benefits but also of public highways, housing, and other publicly-financed or tax-favored
goods.
160 Adamache & Sloan, supra note 148, at 51-52 ("employer contributions to fringe
benefits increase as employee (tax unit) income increases"); Kosters & Steuerle, supra
note 26, at 88 ("The amount of many nontaxed fringe benefits are positively related to
wage levels.").
161 A related problem faces the employer; only cash salary, and not untaxed benefits,
count towards the legal minimum wage. Thus, employers are effectively forbidden from
engaging in a swap of cash salary for benefits even with those low wage employees who
would agree to one. See Kosters & Steuerle, supra note 26, at 88.
162 See id. ("many of the fringe benefits that are not subject to taxation are likely to
be income elastic because they are closer to being luxury goods than necessities").
163 At the very least, most employers will provide benefits through group plans,
which tend to be much cheaper than individually tailored arrangements. See, e.g.,
Adamache & Sloan, supra note 148, at 47; Werther, A New Direction in Rethinking Fringe
Benefits, MSU Bus. Topics 35, 39 (1974); Yerman, Fringe Benefits: Tax Shelterfor the Work-
ing Man, 1 CoLuM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 56, 57 (1965).
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the tax system 16 means the tax advantage of receiving fringes in-
stead of cash salary increases as income rises. The choice for a 15%
marginal tax rate taxpayer is, as we saw above, between $85 in cash
and a $100165 fringe benefit. For a taxpayer in a 28% bracket, the
relevant comparison is between the benefit and $72 in cash. 166 The
tax system thus provides relatively low income taxpayers much less
incentive to choose fringe benefits rather than cash salary.
Because both an employee's valuation differential tends to de-
crease and the tax incentive offered by the government for making
such trades tends to increase as the employee's income rises, it fol-
lows quite naturally that an employee's willingness to trade at least
the employer's costs in cash to receive the benefit also increases
with income.' 67 The chances that the employer can recoup its cost
of providing such benefits, if not actually profit from doing so, cor-
respondingly increase with the employee's income. 68 It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that profit maximizing employers tend to pro-
vide higher paid employees more fringe benefits than lower paid
employees.
2. The Incidental Effects of Nondiscrimination Rules
Congress intended the nondiscrimination rules to reverse the
tendency of employers to provide higher paid employees more
fringe benefits than lower paid employees. The rules require em-
ployers to make a choice; they may provide the same or similar ben-
efits to lower paid employees as they voluntarily provide higher paid
employees, or they may forfeit some or all of the tax advantage real-
ized by employees receiving fringe benefits. The costs of these al-
ternatives are different for different employers.
The choice is easy and costless for those employers who find
that they can meet the nondiscrimination tests without providing ad-
164 Despite the latest round of tax reform, which flattened out the rate schedule by
lowering the top marginal rate and reducing the number of tax brackets to two, 15%
and 28%, the federal income tax is still progressive; that is, both marginal and average
tax rates increase in conjunction with income. See Yorio, supra note 152, at 438-39. In-
deed, due to the "phasing-out" of a variety of tax deductions and allowances the new
rate schedule is more progressive than the one it replaced over certain income ranges.
See Coven, Congress as Indian-Giver: "Phasing-Out" Tax Allowances Under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, 6 VA. TAx REv. 505, 505-06 (1987) (arguing that phase-outs are inequitable
and inefficient).
165 Measured by the employer's cost, assuming the employer passes the entire tax
benefit on to the employee.
166 If the employee received the $100 spent by the employer to provide the fringe
benefit in cash, only $72 would remain after the employee paid a 28% tax.
167 Employees may be willing to give up more than the cost of the fringe benefit,
because they obtain a tax reduction along with it.
168 This effect works in the opposite direction, of course, as an employee's income
decreases.
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ditional benefits to employees unwilling to give up in cash salary at
least the cost of providing benefits. This possibility arises because
even the most stringent nondiscrimination rule does not require
either uniform access to benefits or the distribution of benefits to all
employees, but requires only that some proportion of nonhighly
compensated employees have access to and benefit from a plan.
Also, the definition of nonhighly compensated employees is broad
enough to encompass many employees willing to engage in volun-
tary trades. Depending on the composition of the work force and
the percentage of highly compensated individuals covered by the
plan, the requisite percentage of nonhighly compensated employees
may be drawn only from this group. 169 Finally the likelihood that
employers will be able to comply without cost also increases because
of their ability to exclude employees under age twenty-one and part-
time and seasonal employees, two of the traditionally lowest paid
groups, from consideration altogether. 170
To the extent meeting the nondiscrimination standards re-
quires employers to provide benefits to employees unwilling to ab-
sorb their full cost in the form of a salary reduction, the
nondiscrimination rules impose additional costs on the employers.
The employer must absorb the costs of providing benefits to those
employees (essentially redirecting its fringe benefits profit to
nonhighly compensated employees) or lose much if not all of its
ability to profit from providing benefits. Much of the excess
"value" 171 which makes profits possible stems from the tax advan-
tage provided recipients of benefits. The value disappears if the tax
advantage disappears. 172 Even excess value attributable to the vol-
169 The higher the percentage of employees paid at or close to minimum wage
levels, the more likely it is that the employer will have to provide nonhighly compen-
sated employees some subsidy to encourage their participation and maintain requisite
coverage and benefit levels. By contrast, the better paid the nonhighly compensated
workers are, the more likely it is that the employer can find the requisite number willing
to engage in a voluntary trade. Allowing only a small percentage of highly compensated
employees to benefit from a plan would also make voluntary trading more likely. The
savings achieved by eliminating subsidies to low income employees may, however, be
outweighed by the loss of opportunities to engage in favorable trades with highly com-
pensated employees.
170 See I.R.C. § 89(h)(l)(B)-(D).
171 This excess value consists of the difference between the employee's subjective
valuation of the benefit (or his cost of purchasing it from someone other than his em-
ployer, if lower) and the employer's cost of providing the benefit. See supra text accom-
panying notes 155-56.
172 Most employees could, if they tried hard enough, obtain many of the benefits
provided by their employers at favorable group rates by affiliating themselves with a
non-employer group. See Adamache & Sloan, supra note 148, at 47. Given the existence
of this alternative, the discrepancy between an employer's cost of providing benefits and
their employee's valuation (which cannot exceed the cost of self-provision) probably
comes from the tax advantages for recipients of employer-provided fringes.
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ume discount an employer obtains as a large customer declines in
the absence of a tax advantage because fewer employees will want to
participate in the fringe benefit plan.
The choice of a particular employer will depend on the relative
costs of the alternatives. On the one hand, if the costs of bringing
the plan into compliance with the nondiscrimination rules are
greater than the savings the employer derives from providing fringe
benefits to employees, the employer is likely to discontinue the pro-
gram. On the other hand, if the costs of compliance are lower, it is
likely to extend the program to cover the required number of
under-contributing employees.1 73 Paradoxically, the result of effec-
tive nondiscrimination rules will in many cases be shrinkage of
fringe benefit plan coverage to the class of employees who are will-
ing to make the necessary trade in the absence of a tax advantage-
the richest, not the poorest, employees. 174
Thus, the nondiscrimination rules will often have a trickle-up
rather than a trickle-down effect. Instead of merely forcing the ben-
efits of fringe benefit plans to be distributed to lower level employ-
ees, the nondiscrimination rules may impose lower paid employees'
preference for cash salaries on the more highly paid employees.
The ultimate effect of the trickle-up effect will be to increase reve-
nue for the Treasury because fewer nontaxable fringe benefits will
survive.
Even in cases where the trickle-up effect does not immediately
lead to the termination of a fringe benefits plan, the imposition of a
nondiscrimination rule may subtly sabotage such plans and make
them less sustainable over the long term. It may do this because of
the interplay between the nondiscrimination rules' stripping away of
excess benefits generated by high level employees and the public
173 Because the recent decrease in marginal tax rates, compare I.R.C. § 1 (1985) (top
rate for individuals 50%) with I.R.C. § 1 (top rate for individuals 28%), also has the
effect of decreasing the tax advantage of being paid fringe benefits rather than cash, one
suspects that employers will increasingly choose to eliminate fringe benefit plans.
174 Of course, that outcome may be acceptable because, in contrast to the present
system, no outlay of government funds would subsidize the health insurance. See supra
note 151. The outcome would be an example of the unequal distribution of wealth. As
long as some lower paid workers continue to receive tax-free, employer-provided bene-
fits, however, lower paid workers who lose their benefit plans as a result of the operation
of the nondiscrimination rules will (and should) regard these rules as extremely unfair.
From their perspective, the rules force them to give up the small subsidy provided by
their highly paid co-workers' tax savings (which have been appropriated by their em-
ployer, see text accompanying notes 171-72) because it is too small, while no more de-
serving workers at other firms continue to collect larger subsidies. The rules hurt those
who are already the worst off; to the extent their plight results from the structure of their
employment unit rather than abuse of the tax rules (as it well might, see supra note 110
(describing differential impact of benefits test based on personnel structure of firm)), it
is hard to justify.
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choice problem that affects all group decisionmaking. The next sec-
tion discusses how public choice affects responses to nondiscrimina-
tion rules.
C. The Public Choice Effect
1. Expected Effects: The Theory Revisited
As explained in Part I, it is impossible to find a "best" choice
when individuals with multi-peaked preferences must choose among
three or more alternatives. As a result, no decision reached by the
group is truly satisfactory to its members, and they may, out of sheer
frustration, decide not to make any choice at all.
To the extent this public choice dilemma afflicts the choices be-
tween and levels of different benefits offered in a fringe benefit plan,
it reduces the attractiveness of such plans. Dissatisfaction with a
plan's offerings reduces employees' willingness to pay for it through
salary reductions; employers gaining little benefit from the plans as
a result of the trickle-up effect of the nondiscrimination rules may
then find it cheaper to discontinue the plans altogether.
In the fringe benefit context, the impossibility of reaching a
"best" solution does not necessarily mean that the employer will opt
for an all-cash compensation package. A majority, or even all of the
employees, might prefer to receive several fringes rather than their
cash equivalent. Even if a majority of employees prefers another
fringe to the one the employer currently provides, the same majority
might also prefer the current fringe if the alternative is a no-fiinge,
all-cash compensation package. 175 If enough employees value
enough of the fringes at less than the amount of cash salary (after
reduction by the appropriate tax liability), however, the employer is
better off providing all cash compensation.
Consider, for example, the likely result if the employees in the
example in Part I subjectively valued the three benefits, each of
which the employer can provide at a cost of $100, as follows:
175 Suppose, for example, employees A, B, and C from Table 1 attached the follow-
ing values to the three fringe benefits:
Table #2
Employee Health Insurance Life Insurance Dependent Care
A $90 $60 0
B $ 0 $80 $50
C $90 $60 100
Although a vote among fringes would lead to the deadlock described in Section I, if the
group faced an explicit choice of health insurance or cash, a majority (A and C) would
favor the health insurance over the cash, whether they were in the 15% or 28% tax
bracket, because the $90 value they attach to the insurance is greater than the $85 or
$72 they would realize, after payment of income taxes, from $100 of cash.
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Table #3
Employee Health Insurance Life Insurance Dependent Care
A $100 $ 60 $ 50
B $ 10 $100 $ 15
C $ 60 $ 40 $100
If all three employees are in the 28% tax bracket, the cash salary
paid to each in the absence of a fringe benefit would be worth $72.
As no single benefit is worth more than $72 to two or more employ-
ees, a majority of the employees would prefer cash to any benefit,
and the employer would be well-advised to provide only cash
compensation. 1 76
As this example demonstrates, however, there is another solu-
tion to the dilemma. 177 The employer might provide two fringe
benefits rather than one in return for an appropriately large reduc-
tion in the employees' cash salary-say, $200. If so, employees A
and C could form a majority coalition supporting a fringe benefit
package consisting of both life insurance and dependent care. Each
would be slightly better off with this package of benefits than with
$200 of additional cash salary. The cash would be worth only $144
to them after payment of taxes, while the benefit package would be
worth $150 to A and $160 to C.178 However, it is precisely coali-
tions such as this which the nondiscrimination rules make difficult to
form. Formation of a coalition necessarily involves opting for a rela-
tively costly benefit package. The more costly the package, the less
likely it is that lower-paid employees will find the entire package at-
tractive. Consider, for example, what would happen to the coalition
176 The employer would be unlikely to recoup the full cost of providing the fringe
benefit via reductions in employees' cash salaries in such a situation. The net result,
therefore, would be an increase in the employer's total labor costs and a corresponding
decrease in net profits. Cf. supra text accompanying note 149.
177 This solution is not always available. For beneficial trades to be possible, the
intensity of the individuals' preferences must vary. D. MUELLER, supra note 7, at 49.
Consider the outcome if, in the above example, the $100 values remained the same and
all the other values became $44 (i.e. $28 below the value of the cash). There is no trade
now preferred by a majority.
178 In the political science literature, this trading process is called "logrolling." See,
e.g., R. MusGRAvE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 9, at 119. Commentators split on whether
"logrolling" is a valuable democratic process or an evil to be prevented whenever possi-
ble. Compare id. at 119 (logrolling is a "constructive factor in decision making") with
Riker & Brams, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1235 (1973) (recom-
mending reforms to eliminate logrolling). Logrolling can either increase or decrease
the welfare of the community as a whole. Where, as in the text's example, the trades
produce less gains for the traders than losses for the nontraders, it is tempting to believe
that overall welfare has been reduced, although interpersonal utility comparisons are, of
course, a minefield. Such trades are surely capable of raising net welfare. For a more
complete discussion of the opportunities provided by and problems associated with log-
rolling, see D. MUELLER, supra note 7, at 49-58.
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described above if A were in the 15% tax bracket for purposes of
the second fringe benefit election. 179 The package would now be
worth less to A than all cash compensation and the coalition would
fall apart.180 Thus, the nondiscrimination rules intensify the depres-
sive effect of the public choice constraint on use of fringe benefits.
Moreover, the nondiscrimination rules may further discourage
use of fringe benefit compensation by reducing the advantages of
fringe benefits for employers and relatively highly paid employees-
natural supporters of fringe benefits. By requiring that some of the
benefits of the tax advantage provided for fringes be diverted to em-
ployees who, if asked, would prefer cash salary to fringes, 81 the
nondiscrimination rules take away some of the incentive for the re-
maining parties to choose benefits over cash. As a result, those par-
ties (highly paid employees) will find cash compensation less
objectionable and perhaps even an attractive option.
Divergences in employees' opinions as to the desirability of a
particular plan impose their own costs on the sponsoring employer.
Even in those situations where a coalition can be formed to force
adoption of a benefit package, it is unlikely that the package will
make every employee better off. There will be losers, like employee
B in the example. The employer will have to either assuage the ill
feelings of B by providing concessions in some other area, tolerate
expression of B's discontent, or lose B to an employer who offers
more cash and fewer fringe benefits. None of these alternatives is
costless. Nondiscrimination rules limit the benefits an employer can
obtain from fringes and make it more likely that the costs of provid-
ing the fringe benefits will outweigh the benefits to the employer.
Employers might, therefore, favor the use of more cash compensa-
tion because of nondiscrimination rules. The nondiscrimination
rules may also induce employers to divert more of the benefits of
the tax advantages to themselves (in order to pay for benefits pro-
vided to the less willing, lower-paid, employees) by more sharply
reducing higher-paid employees' cash salaries. 182 Higher paid em-
179 This would occur whenever A's taxable income, in the event he receives all cash
salary and no fringe benefits, exceeds the amount of income taxable in the 15% bracket
by $100. In such a case, a 28%o tax would apply to the salary A has to give up to receive
the first finge benefit and that salary would be worth only $72 to A; however, a 15%o tax
would apply to the $100 he has to forego to receive the second fringe and it is, there-
fore, worth $85 to A.
180 This example illustrates the phenomenon generally referred to as "the endow-
ment effect."
181 See supra note 159-68 and accompanying text.
182 Although it is always in an employer's interest to reduce employees' cash salaries
by the maximum possible amount, employers frequently fail to attain this goal. See supra
note 149. By increasing the employer's cost of providing such benefits, however, non-
discrimination rules alter the parties' bargaining positions, bringing employers closer to
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ployees would then gain less from the trade of cash for benefits.
In the course of cycling from one available benefits package to
another, the employer will probably adopt packages that each em-
ployee disfavors. To an employee, already reduced benefits of a
current wage-fringe package may not be worth the risk of even less
desired cash-fringe packages in future years (indeed, perhaps even
one less attractive than an all-cash package). As a result, employees
might take the position-even in a year when they prefer the prof-
fered cash-fringe package to an all cash package-that more com-
pensation should be in cash form. By decreasing the upside returns
from trading cash salary for fringe benefits without ameliorating the
downside risks, the nondiscrimination rules further aggravate the
depressive effect of the public choice dilemma.
An individual employee's preferences for a particular fringe
benefit must be "multi-peaked" for any of these deterrents to fringe
benefit compensation to exist. This means that the strength of an
employee's desire for health insurance must not be a strong indica-
tion of his desire (or non-desire) for life insurance and or legal
insurance.
In the real world, most individuals' desires for fringe benefits
are likely to be multi-peaked. Whether a particular employee
desires a particular benefit depends on such diverse characteristics
as the individual's degree of risk aversion, marital status, spouse's
employment status, dependent children (both number and age), in-
come level, and taste. Although there may be some rough correla-
tions between a few of these characteristics, 8 3 many are completely
independent of one another. There are probably as many individu-
als who rank health insurance and life insurance high among priori-
ties (breadwinners in traditional families, or single parents) as rank
them at opposite ends of their preference schedules (sickly single
individuals, compared to persons whose employed spouses provide
one or both of these benefits for the family). 84 Congress's expan-
sion of the types of fringe benefits that employers may choose un-
doubtedly exacerbates the problem by allowing an even greater
fragmentation among individual employees' preference schedules.
Not only must employees decide how much they like health insur-
ance as compared to life insurance, they also must consider where
educational assistance and legal insurance, among others, fit in. Fi-
that goal. Cf. Popkin, supra note 149, at 452 (employee bargaining power exists "[als
long as the employer's cost is less than the employee's cash wage equivalent").
183 For instance, auto insurance companies have reason to believe that marital status
is related to risk aversion. They charge significantly higher premiums to insure young
single males than young married males.
184 The effect of many demographic characteristics on the desire for typical fringe
benefits is "ambiguous." Turner, supra note 150, at 207.
[Vol. 74:62
1988] PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND THE TAX CODE 101
nally, there is also a question of how much of each benefit to elect.
Multidimensional issues such as these almost invariably lead to
multi-peaked preferences. 185
2. Theory Meets Reality: The Impact of Cafeteria Plans
As the preceding section explains, the presence of nondiscrimi-
nation rules undoubtedly can aggravate the effects of the "public
choice constraint" on the provision of fringe benefits. Whether the
nondiscrimination rules adopted in the fringe benefit area in fact
have this effect is more questionable. None of the rules requires
employers to provide exactly equal benefits of each type to all em-
ployees; rather, most only require employers to provide each type of
benefit to approximately the same proportion of higher and lower
income employees.' 8 6 Thus, if the highly compensated employees
and nonhighly compensated employees share similar prefer-
185 See D. MUELLER, supra note 7, at 195; accord R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra
note 9, at 114.
Although preferences for fringe benefits are doubtlessly multi-peaked across the
population, individual employees could theoretically avoid the problems associated with
multi-peaked distribution by seeking work where other like-minded employees are em-
ployed. The impossibility theorem has no application to choices made by groups of
individuals with homogeneous tastes, regardless of the heterogeneity of the surrounding
population. And, indeed, one senses that to some extent self-selection of this type al-
ready exists. For example, people who particularly enjoy travel tend to work for airlines
and individuals who enjoy fashion often work for fancy clothing stores. It is hard to
envisage, however, such voting-with-their-feet as a solution for more than a few extreme
preferences. Restraints on mobility and the lack of adequate information about the al-
ternatives often fetter individuals' choices. See Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L.
REV. 353, 357, 362-63 (1984); see also Popkin, supra note 149, at 448 (employees do not
know the value of benefits provided by their own employers). Moreover, individuals'
preferences for particular fringes tend to vary over time. Dependent care, for example,
can be a very valuable benefit when an employee has a small child, but of absolutely no
benefit in later years. The value of certain types of health insurance will also change as
the employee ages. For example, maternity coverage becomes less important with age,
while vision care becomes more important. Thus, over time, the consensus collapses
unless a substantial majority of the employees are at the same stage in their course of
desires for the particular benefit, progress to the next stage at the same rate, and are
able to limit new entries to similar individuals. Cf. D. MUELLER, supra note 7, at 55 (dis-
cussing difficulties of maintaining a consensus over time as to the set of public goods
offerings in a community when migration is possible). Although some employees might
migrate out of the community when this happens, thus leading to the re-homogenization
of the community, employees' acquisition ofjob-specific skills and seniority rights tends
to make such moves less attractive and hence less likely. See Adamache & Sloan, supra
note 148, at 48; Leslie, supra, at 357. A substantial collection of public finance literature
details the efficacy (and non-efficacy) of self-selection as an escape from the dilemma
posed by the Arrow Theorem. See, e.g., A. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY
(1970); Buchanan & Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout
Model, 1 J. POL. EcoN. 25 (1972); Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956). D. MUELLER, supra note 7, at 125-47, contains an excellent and
largely non-technical survey of this literature.
186 See supra text accompanying notes 64-145 (describing rules).
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ences, t87 employers could neutralize the effect of the public choice
constraint by providing employees with benefits in accordance with
those preferences.
In fact, Congress provided employers with a mechanism to do
exactly that at about the time it began adding nondiscrimination
rules to the fringe benefits statutes. The mechanism is called a "caf-
eteria plan." Section 125 of the Code first authorized the mecha-
nism in 1978.18 A cafeteria plan is not itself a fringe benefit; rather,
it is a mechanism for the delivery of fringe benefits to employees.
What makes the mechanism special is the amount of choice it places
in the hands of individual employees. Cafeteria plans allow employ-
ees to select, on an individual basis, between cash salary'89 and any
187 That is, approximately the same proportion of highly compensated and
nonhighly compensated employees would engage in a voluntary trade for each type of
fringe benefit.
188 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 134(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2783. Section
125 provides that "no amount shall be included in the gross income of a participant in a
cafeteria plan solely because, under the plan, the participant may choose among the
benefits of the plan." Id. Enactment of the statute followed years of wrangling among
Congress, Treasury, and taxpayers over whether the benefits provided under such a plan
should have the same tax advantages as employer-provided benefits (i.e., the exclusion
from the recipients' income if certain other conditions were fulfilled). Although earlier
administrative pronouncements and court decisions held to the contrary, see Irish, Cafete-
ria Plans in Transition, 25-12 TAx NoTEs 1127, 1133-34 (1984), in 1972, Treasury pro-
posed regulations under section 402 of the Code which made it clear that the
"constructive receipt" doctrine treats such benefits as employee-purchased benefits inel-
igible for the various exclusions-that is, that employees receiving benefits under such
plans would be treated as if they had been paid in cash and then utilized that cash to
purchase the benefits from their employer. Id. at 1134. The regulations dealt with the
use of salary reduction agreements to fund pension plans but the same issue arises
whenever employees are allowed to choose between cash salary and other fringe bene-
fits. See Bassey, Cafeteria, Medical Reimbursement Plans: Terms Causing Problems as Deadlines
Near, 51 J. TAx'N 334, 336 (1979). Congress temporarily resolved this dispute in 1974,
by enacting section 2006 of ERISA. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2006, 88 Stat. 829, 992-93. This section (1) imposed a morato-
rium on the issuance of final salary reduction regulations, (2) froze the law as ofJanuary
1, 1972 for cafeteria plans in existence on June 27, 1974, and (3) provided that benefits
under arrangements established after that date be treated as employee, rather than em-
ployer, provided. Id.; Irish, supra, at 1134. Congress twice amended the moratorium on
the issuance of regulations to extend its period of application through the end of 1979.
See Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-615, § 1505, 92 Stat. 3097,
3097. Despite some ambiguities in the statutory mandate, section 2006 basically pre-
vented the development after 1974 of new cafeteria plans having taxable and nontaxable
options. Cooper & McFadden, Cafeteria Compensation Plans: The Revenue Act of 1978-The
New Ground Rules and Some New Issues, 34 C.L.UJ. 29, 31 (1980). See also Fox & Schaffer,
supra note 22, at 617-19 (recounting legislative and administrative history of constructive
receipt dispute).
189 See I.R.C. § 125(d) (1985) (defining "cafeteria plan"). The 1986 Tax Act broad-
ened the definition of a cafeteria plan to include all schemes in which employees are
allowed to choose "among 2 or more qualified benefits" or "among 2 or more benefits
consisting of cash and qualified benefits." Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§ 1151(d), 100 Stat. 2085, 2504 (codified at I.R.C. § 125(c)(1)(B)). Congress reversed
the change after realizing that "to make the provision effective as a practical matter [it
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of the various nontaxable fringe benefits that comprise the plan's
"menu" of offerings. 190 In short, cafeteria plans allow each em-
ployee to fashion his ideal fringe benefit package, with little or no
consideration for the choices made by his fellow employees. 191
Cafeteria plans have the potential to nullify the public choice
constraint typically associated with fringe benefit plans, leaving only
the "trickle up" effect as a limitation on their use. Moreover, sec-
tion 125's generous nondiscrimination rule seemed to relax even
that constraint. As originally enacted, except with respect to certain
types of medical benefits which were subject to a more stringent
test, 192 section 125 required only that lower paid employees eligible
for benefits under cafeteria plans receive a similar proportion of
their income in the form of tax-free benefits as did the suspect
group of highly compensated employees.19 3 This was a more gener-
ous standard than the "equal amounts" benefits test applicable to
many benefits available under fringe benefit plans. 194 As explained
below, however, the addition of section 125 did not have the cata-
strophic consequences on the public choice constraint this brief de-
scription of it might suggest, though it certainly had more of an
effect on the availability of fringe benefits than Congress foresaw at
the time.
Many members of Congress were unaware of the effect cafeteria
plans would have on the availability of tax-favored fringe benefits
when the enabling legislation was passed. The measure received
relatively little comment at the time and there is little direct evi-
would have to make] additional amendments not intended," and that "such rules would
... add[] complexity not contemplated by Congress." STAFF OF THE JoINT COMMrIrEE
ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS BILL OF 1987 145 (1987). See
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1011B
(a)(12), 102 Stat. 3342, 3485 (codified at I.R.C. § 125(c)(1)(B)).
190 The permissible components of this "menu" have varied over time. See infra text
accompanying note 214.
191 Of course, benefit distributions must meet any applicable nondiscrimination
standards.
192 See I.R.C. § 125(g)(2) (providing that a health benefits plan is nondiscriminatory
if contributions on behalf of all participants include an amount which either equals
100% of the cost of the health coverage of the majority of highly compensated partici-
pants similarly situated or equals or exceeds 75% of the cost of the health benefit cover-
age of similarly situated plan participants having the highest cost health benefit coverage
under the plan, and contributions or benefits other than health benefits bear a uniform
relationship to compensation). But see Fox & Schaffer, supra note 22, at 625-27 (discuss-
ing "ambiguity" of section 125(g)(2)'s nondiscrimination rule); Gordon, Adventures in
Obscurity: Section 12 5(g)(2 ) of the Code, 34-9 TAX NOTES 919 (1987) (arguing the effect of
section 12 5 (g)( 2 ) is to loosen the generally applicable nondiscrimination rules in the
context of cafeteria plans providing health benefits).
193 See S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 22. See also I.R.C. § 125(g)(2)(B) (1982).
194 See Wiedenbeck, supra note 60, at 229.
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dence of Congress's motivations for passing it. 195 No one seems to
have considered the effect cafeteria plans could have on the total
amount of nontaxable benefits provided by employers. Indeed, the
revenue estimate accompanying the bill projected that granting tax-
favored status to benefits provided under cafeteria plans would have
no revenue effect. 196
In part, Congress's lack of concern may reflect the fact that the
cafeteria plan rules were not as generous as the language of section
125 indicated. For example, section 125's liberal nondiscrimination
rule applied in addition to, rather than in lieu of, the nondiscrimina-
tion standards already applicable to particular benefits offered
under the plan. 19 7 Thus, for example, if one of the benefits avail-
able under a cafeteria plan were group legal services, both the
group of employees electing such benefits and the amount of legal
services actually provided under the plan had to meet the nondis-
crimination standards imposed by section 120 and section 125. Be-
cause the nondiscrimination rule contained in section 120 required
that low paid employees receive "benefits" approximately equal in
amount to those provided highly compensated employees, 198 the
existence of the cafeteria plan's liberal rule was essentially irrelevant
for recipients and purveyors of those benefits. Compliance with sec-
tion 125 alone would not make group legal services benefits distrib-
uted under a fringe benefits plan excludable from income. The real
195 S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 22, at 74-76. Later commentators ascribe its success
to a variety of motives. One such motive was the desire to impose a nondiscrimination
requirement on existing but as yet unregulated forms of welfare benefit plans. See Bas-
sey, supra note 188, at 336-37; Fox & Schaffer, supra note 22, at 626. See also Revenue Act
of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 13511 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
1147-49 (1978) (statement of Converse Murdock, Esq. that many small businesses al-
ready had "cafeteria plans" without realizing it and operated them in a way that proba-
bly violated proposed nondiscrimination rules). Another alleged motivation was the
control of health care costs. By offering employees the opportunity to reclaim any sav-
ings in health insurance premiums in the form of cash or more desirable benefits, Con-
gress believed that cafeteria plans would provide an inducement for employees with
expensive health insurance benefits to switch to less comprehensive coverage. Such a
switch would, in turn, reduce total health expenditures and, in the long run, health care
costs. See Department of Health and Human Services, A Study of Cafeteria Plans and Flex'ble
Spending Accounts, reprinted in 540 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH), at 21 & nn.18-19, 39-40 (Aug.
8, 1985) [hereinafter Cafeteria Plan Study].
196 See H.R. REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1978). For a complete account-
ing of Treasury's and Congress's input on this issue, see Fox & Schaffer, supra note 22,
at 619-34.
197 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 254 (1978) ("ifa self-insured
medical reimbursement plan is included in a 'cafeteria plan', the medical reimbursement
plan rules would determine the status of a benefit as a taxable or nontaxable fringe
benefit"). Treasury generalized this to cover all benefits provided under a cafeteria plan
in its 1984 proposed regulations. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-1, Q& A - 16, 49 Fed.
Reg. 19,321 (1984).
198 See supra text accompanying notes 112-21.
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impact of the rule fell on benefits not already subject to any nondis-
crimination rule, and, for these, it imposed a restriction where there
had been none before.
Subjecting benefits distributed under cafeteria plans to the pre-
existing nondiscrimination tests did more than rejuvenate the
"trickle-up effect." It also ensured that the public choice dilemma
would continue to exist at a reduced level of significance. Although
employees could elect whatever benefits were available under the
plan, benefits provided to highly paid employees were excludable
from income only if a sufficient percentage of nonhighly paid em-
ployees elected similar amounts of the same benefits. 199 Benefits
provided to highly compensated employees would be taxed even if
all employees chose the same number of dollars of nontaxable bene-
fits, if the nonhighly paid employees preferred a different mix of
benefits. 200 Thus, complete nontaxability depended on whether
nonhighly paid employees desired the same benefits as their highly
compensated counterparts. It may be more likely that a consensus
as to the amount and type of desirable benefits exists in a narrow
cross-section of a heterogenous group of employees than for the
entire employee group, but it also is possible that employee prefer-
ences as to the desirability of particular benefits will be stratified
according to income level. If the latter is the case, the overlapping
of the general cafeteria plan and benefit-specific nondiscrimination
rules effectively dissipated the advantage of having a cafeteria plan
and reimposed the public choice dilemma.
The limiting effect of this overlapping of nondiscrimination
rules, though, was not enough to prevent cafeteria plans from hav-
ing a seriously adverse effect on the federal budget. Commentators
soon realized that widespread use of cafeteria plans could lead to
massive revenue losses.20 In part, this was because plans partially
ameliorated the public choice dilemma. Primarily, however, it was
because the use of salary reduction agreements to fund cafeteria
plans, as apparently sanctioned by Congress, made possible the de-
199 See Wiedenbeck, supra note 60, at 243. Merely providing an opportunity to par-
ticipate in a plan offering benefits through a cafeteria plan is not sufficient to meet most
eligibility requirements, let alone benefit level tests. To "benefit" from a plan, an em-
ployee must "participate" in it. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. To par-
ticipate in a benefit plan made available under a cafeteria plan, an employee must elect to
participate-an act which requires forgoing the opportunity to obtain another benefit or
cash. Employees who are unlikely to utilize such a plan would presumably hesitate to
make such a sacrifice.
200 See Wiedenbeck, supra note 60, at 243.
201 See Chapoton Testimony, supra note 151, at 1195; Cafeteria Plan Study, supra note 195,
at i (revenue losses will grow to $12 billion per year in 1983 dollars from health spend-
ing component alone); Thompson, Flxible Compensation Plans and the Small Employer, 83-7
TAx MGMT. COMP. PLAN. J. 24, 25 (1983).
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velopment of more attractive forms of traditional fringe benefits.202
Beginning in 1982, the type of plan that came to be known as
the "flexible spending account" plan appeared. 20 3 These plans al-
lowed employees to put pre-tax dollars aside in accounts from which
medical expenses, child care expenses, or legal expenses could be
paid. At the end of each year, any unused amounts left in the ac-
counts were distributed in the form of cash to the employees or
were rolled over to their following year's fringe benefit accounts.20 4
These plans quickly evolved into "zebras," (zero balance account
plans) under which employers simply reduced employees' taxable
income on the basis of evidence of qualifying expenditures without
the bookkeeping formality of an individual account for each em-
ployee. 205 The employer then issued separate checks to pay (or re-
imburse the employee for paying) the qualified expenditures. By
allowing employees to self-insure against incurring the tax-favored
categories of expenditures, these plans guaranteed that employees
would receive the monies committed to them either in the form of
cash salary or as payment of expenses actually incurred. As a result,
these plans were profitable even for those individuals who believed
their risk of incurring a tax-favored liability was low. 20 6 The plans
provided all employees with a costless means of obtaining the maxi-
mum government subsidy available for each category of expendi-
tures. Even lower paid employees benefited. When guaranteed
either benefits or a return of their contribution, lower paid employ-
ees who were otherwise unwilling to insure against remote contin-
gencies could be enticed to participate in fringe benefit plans. Of
202 To some extent, the result of combining the salary reduction and cafeteria plan
mechanisms is a further loosening of the public choice constraint; such plans allow em-
ployees individually to determine the amount of their income payable in the form of
fringe benefits, as well as the types of benefits received. Of course, employers can
achieve the same result by offering a very rich cafeteria plan with a cash option. Plans
which offer a choice among nontaxable benefits but not among such benefits and cash
avoid only the latter source of the public choice constraint. This may be one reason
Congress and Treasury were willing to exclude non-cash-option plans from the purview
of section 125, see supra note 189, and allow such plans to offer some benefits which
cannot be included in a cafeteria plan's menu. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-28-067 (1987) (ap-
proving plan offering educational assistance as an option). However, the use of the sal-
ary reduction device had an effect independent of the relaxation of the public choice
constraint. It allowed employees to elect benefits with retrospective knowledge; that is,
instead of trading cash for insurance against particular potential expenditures, employ-
ees could trade cash salary for payment of liabilities actually incurred. The latter is a
more attractive option for many. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 203-06.
203 Cafeteria Plan Study, supra note 195, at 1.
204 Id. at Al-4.
205 Id.
206 If expenses were incurred, such individuals would be entitled to pay them out of
pre-tax dollars. If, as expected, no such expenses materialized, the individuals would
receive the balance left in their account in cash and be no worse off as a result of their
participation.
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course, the more lower level participation existed, the more benefits
upper income employees could receive without violating the nondis-
crimination rules. Under zebra plans, although nondiscrimination
rules would continue to have bite, it would be at a higher level of
fringe benefit expenditure. And the higher the level of fringe bene-
fit expenditures, the greater the loss in tax revenue.
Because only the government (and not employees) could lose
under these plans, the plans received instant notoriety.20 7 Afraid of
huge revenue losses, in 1984 Treasury hurriedly issued a portion of
its long delayed 208 regulations for the implementation of section
125.209 Utilizing questionable interpretations of traditional tax law
principles and the legislative history of section 125,210 these regula-
tions concluded that neither zebras nor flexible spending account
plans qualified as cafeteria plans eligible for the benefits of section
125.211 The regulations forced cafeteria plans to operate under a
"use it or lose it" principle, which made participation much less at-
tractive for employees who did not perceive themselves as likely to
207 Several articles extolling the virtues of such plans appeared in both trade and
popular publications. See, e.g., Werther, Implementing Flexible Fringe Benefits Through Varia-
ble Incentive Plans, 33 C.L.U.J. 37, 39 (1979) ("flexible benefit plans do offer a solution to
the most serious flaws in traditional approaches"); Companies Offer Benefits Cafeteria Style,
Bus. WK., Nov. 13, 1978, at 116. However, commentators divide on the question of
whether this publicity triggered the adoption of many plans. Compare Cafeteria Plan Study,
supra note 195, at A1-4 ("FSAs were quickly adopted by many employers") and Bassey,
supra note 188, at 336 ("cafeteria plans ... have perhaps been the most frequently used
fringe benefit of all in recent years") with Thompson, supra note 201, at 24 ("only about
three dozen companies currently sponsor flexible programs"); Burgess, Cafeteria Plans
and Alternative Methods for Providing Taxable Benefits to Employees (Part 1), 13 CoMP. PLAN. J.
166, 167 (1985) ("increased use of cafeteria plans following enactment of § 125 has not
been widespread") and EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND SMALL FIRMS, supra note 147,
at 89 ("Five percent of employees in medium and large firms were offered flexible bene-
fits plans, reimbursement accounts, or both.").
208 Commentators recognized the need for immediate guidance on many aspects of
cafeteria plan formation as early as 1979. See, e.g., Bassey, supra note 188, at 338-39; Fox
& Schaffer, supra note 22, at 635. The absence of such guidance made these plans too
risky to be widely adopted. Bassey, supra note 188, at 338-39 (absence of rulings and
regulations "[a]s a practical matter ... frustrate[d] Congressional intent to make the
benefits of the cafeteria plan available to a wide cross-section of employees"); Fox &
Schaffer, supra note 22, at 636 ("In the absence of regulations, cafeteria plans spread
slowly.").
209 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Tax Treatment of Cafeteria Plans, 49 Fed. Reg.
19,329, Q& A - 17-18 (May 7, 1984) [hereinafter Notice of Proposed Rulemaking]. The
regulations were preceded by a news release summarizing their contents. I.R.S. News
Release IR-84-22 (Feb. 10, 1984).
210 See, e.g., Chip, New Cafeteria Plan Regulations Contain Implications for Other Employee
Plans, 63J. TAx'N 72 (1985) ("rule in Proposed Regulations against guaranteed amounts
appears to be a newly discovered general principle of tax law"); Irish, supra note 188, at
1133-39 ("[T]he deferred compensation position implicit in the proposed regulations
defies common sense, established distinctions, and settled case law.").
211 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 209; Cafeteria Plan Study, supra
note 195, at A1-4.
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incur health care and other expenses. 212
In the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Congress implicitly en-
dorsed Treasury's position on the "use it or lose it" principle21 3 and
cut back on the types of nontaxable benefits in a cafeteria plan's
menu. After January 1, 1985, cafeteria plans could offer only cash
and "statutory fringe benefits," defined as "any benefit which ... is
not includible in the gross income of the employee by reason of an
express provision of this chapter (other than section 117, 124, 127,
or 132)."214 The effect of this change is to reimpose the public
choice constraint on the provision of the excluded benefits. To-
gether, these revisions made cafeteria plans less comprehensive, less
attractive mechanisms for delivery of fringe benefits.
3. Reality Reformed: Reworking the Rules
Congress revisited the fringe benefit area yet again in 1986.
The statutory changes enacted in that round of tax reform had con-
flicting effects on the continuation of the public choice constraint.
Some of the changes relaxed the constraint by increasing the attrac-
tiveness of cafeteria plans while others could only have the opposite
effect.
The first and most obvious of the changes is the joint benefits
test, made possible by the interaction of subsections (i)(2), (j)(7),
and (g)(4) of new section 89. Subsection 89(i)(2) allows, but does
not require, employers to treat qualified group legal services plans,
educational assistance programs, and dependent care assistance
plans as "statutory fringe benefit plans." 2 15 Once an employer
elects to treat such a plan as a "statutory fringe benefit plan," sec-
tion 89(j)(7) tests for discrimination in accordance with section 89's
rules rather than the otherwise applicable standards.2 1 6 Finally, sec-
tion 89(g)(4) allows employers to treat all statutory fringe benefit
212 Such employees would lose any amounts left in their accounts at the end of the
year. Thus, overestimating expenses would inflict a real cost on the participating
employee.
213 In section 531(b)(5) of the 1984 Act, Congress included transition rules for the
application of the Proposed Regulations to preexisting cafeteria plans. See Tax Reform
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531 (b)(5), 98 Stat. 494, 883. By doing so, it implicitly
endorsed the substantive validity of the regulations. Irish, supra note 188, at 1132.
214 I.R.C. § 125(e)(1). The benefits excepted by the parenthetical include tuition re-
mission, educational assistance, vanpooling, and the miscellaneous benefits legitimized
by section 132, leaving only health insurance, life insurance, disability benefits, legal
insurance, dependent care, and certain qualified cash or deferred pension arrangements
within the definition of "statutory fringe benefits." Some of the benefits omitted from
the cafeteria plan menu, like educational assistance, can be provided under flexible
plans without a cash option. See supra note 202.
215 I.R.C. § 89(i)(2).
216 I.R.C. § 89(0)(7).
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plans except health plans2 17 as plans of the same type for purposes
of applying the benefits test of section 89(e). This test, as the tena-
cious reader may recall, requires that nonhighly compensated em-
ployees receive, on average, employer-provided benefits valued at
three-quarters of the average employer provided benefits distrib-
uted to highly compensated employees under plans of the same
type.
Allowing combinations of different types of plans for purposes
of this test makes variations in the selection of benefits irrelevant.
For example, if an employer elects to treat both dependent care
assistance and legal insurance as statutory fringe benefit plans, it
can meet the benefits test if all nonhighly compensated employees
choose to receive benefits in the form of dependent care assistance
while highly compensated employees choose an equivalent amount
of legal services. Both types of plans have to be open to a cross-
section of employees,218 but neither actually has to be used by a
cross-section of employees. As long as the nonhighly compensated
employees find one of the plans attractive enough to participate to
the extent required,219 the plan meets the discrimination standards.
No public choice constraint independent of the trickle-up restraint
necessarily restricts the delivery of "statutory fringe benefits."
Liberalization of the benefits test appears to be a stunning con-
cession by Congress. Further examination reveals, however, that its
impact (and hence its revenue implications) will be far less signifi-
cant than the statutory language suggests. This results largely from
the type of benefits eligible as "statutory fringe benefits." Two of
the three eligible fringe benefits, group legal services plans and edu-
cational assistance programs, were supposed to lose their tax-fa-
vored status before section 89 became effective. Temporary
exclusions for these benefits were supposed to last only until De-
cember 31, 1987, the effective date of section 89.220 Congress may,
217 But see supra note 139.
218 Plans must satisfy both the eligibility and benefits level tests. I.R.C. § 89(c).
219 That is, enough to meet the three-quarters ratio required by section 89(e).
220 Congress amended section 120(e) to provide, "this section... shall not apply to
taxable years ending after December 31, 1987," Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, § 1162(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2549, while section 127(d) was amended to provide
that "this section shall not apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1987."
Id. § 1162(a)(1). For a discussion of the effective date of section 89, see supra note 63.
Indeed, the reason Congress gave for omitting group legal plans and educational plans
from mandatory coverage by section 89 was "that these types of plans generally are
scheduled to expire prior to the effective date of the new nondiscrimination rules."
1986 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 64, at 809. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra
note 81, at pt. 2, at 508. Congress extended the termination date for group legal serv-
ices plans in the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
647, § 4001, 102 Stat. 3342, but only for one year. Id.
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of course, extend the tax-free status of these benefits,221 but such
extensions are not guaranteed. Thus, it is uncertain whether either
type of benefit will ever be part of section 89(h) packages. More-
over, even if Congress again extends the expiration date, it is un-
likely to further liberalize the exclusion by making educational
assistance available though a cafeteria plan. The inability to dis-
tribute such benefits through a cafeteria plan makes avoiding the
public choice constraint more difficult, because employers will have
difficulty identifying in advance those employees whose cash salaries
should be bargained down to pay for the plan.222 Finally, the 1986
Tax Act even made dependent care assistance less valuable than it
had been. The Act imposes a more restrictive cap on the quantity of
excludable benefits that may be distributed under a plan. Prior to
1987, an employee could exclude dependent care assistance up to
the lower-earning spouse's income; now the exclusion is limited to
the lower of that amount or $5000.223 In sum, Congress tempered
its generosity considerably in the fine print.
Broadening the list of excludable employees for purposes of ap-
plying the benefits tests to health plans and dependent care assist-
ance may be the provision of the 1986 Tax Act that most effectively
reduces the public choice constraint. Under this provision, an em-
ployer may ignore employees (together with their families) who are
covered by "a health plan providing core benefits maintained by an-
other employer," 224 when determining whether a health plan dis-
tributes benefits in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Similarly, when
providing family coverage, an employer has the option of separately
running the benefits test for the expense of providing family cover-
age and only including employees with families in its calculations. 225
Finally, when running a benefits test on dependent care assistance
programs 226 funded through salary reduction agreements, employ-
ers may exclude employees earning less than $25,000.227 In each
221 See supra note 220 (extension of favorable tax treatment of group legal services
plans). Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1162(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2549
(1986).
222 But see supra note 202.
223 I.R.C. § 129(a)(2).
224 I.R.C. § 89(g)(2)(A)(i).
225 I.R.C. § 89(g)(2)(A)(ii).
226 See I.R.C. § 129(d)(7)(A) (requiring average benefit provided nonhighly compen-
sated employees under plan to equal 55% of average benefits provided highly compen-
sated employees).
227 I.R.C. § 129(d)(8)(B). At this income level, the child care credit available under
section 21 is more valuable to a taxpayer than is the exclusion. Taxpayers (if well-in-
formed) will, therefore, always opt to pay their child care expenses themselves and claim
the credit rather than avail themselves of the salary reduction possibility. See Sheppard,
Ways and Means Aide Discusses Tax Bill's Health Plan Nondiscrimination Rules, 32-13 TAx
NOTES 1219, 1221 (1986).
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case, the excluded employees are among the least likely employees
to take advantage of plan benefits because they have no use for
them. Absent the exclusions, plans would likely fail the benefits test
if a disproportionate number of such employees fell within the
nonhighly compensated group and the employees had the option of
cash rather than the benefit.
For example, consider an employer who offers to provide family
coverage worth $2000 to all ten of its employees, six of whom (in-
cluding the employer's two highly compensated employees) actually
have families. Assuming each of the employees with families elects
to take advantage of the offer, absent the exclusion, the average em-
ployer-provided benefit for highly compensated employees would
be $2000 (2000 X 2/2) while the average employer-provided bene-
fit for less highly compensated employees would be $1000 (2000 X
4/8)-well under 75% of highly compensated employees' benefits.
As a result, $1000 of the health insurance provided upper income
employees would be included in their income. By contrast, once
single employees are excluded, the average employer-provided ben-
efit is the same for both highly and nonhighly compensated employ-
ees and the highly compensated employees can exclude all $2000 of
insurance from their income. While these exclusions do not neces-
sarily cover all the employees who would not want to participate in a
health or dependent care assistance plan, 228 they diminish the im-
pact of the public choice constraint by compensating for the dispro-
portionate distribution of some significant causes of differentials in
utilization patterns.
These liberalizations were not the only changes the 1986 Tax
Act made in the fringe benefit rules. Congress also prospectively
eliminated two types of previously available fringe benefits and im-
posed a cap on one other.229 These changes, unlike the reductions
in the public choice constraint, will raise revenue. Perhaps Con-
gress, after silent examination of revenue and equity concerns, has
decided to change its approach towards the regulation of fringe
benefits; instead of relying on the public choice constraint, it may be
moving towards more direct limitation of the amount and types of
excludable benefits coupled with a more effective trickle-up con-
straint. This sacrifices approximately the same amount of revenue
but distributes the largesse to a larger, more diverse group of tax-
payers than before. If so, we can expect to see future changes along
228 For purposes of running the benefits test on dependent care assistance pro-
grams, no exclusion is provided for employees without dependents (as it is for the provi-
sion of family coverage provided under health plans). See I.R.C. § 89(g)(2)(A). Perhaps
the reduction in the required ratio (from 75% to 557o) is intended to compensate for
this seemingly unfair discrepancy.
229 See supra text accompanying notes 220-23.
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the lines of the 1986 Tax Act. As I discuss in Part IV, such a deci-
sion may well be justifiable on social policy grounds.
The appearance of the public choice constraint in one area of
the Code is interesting but not necessarily significant. Especially in
light of the trend towards minimizing its impact in the fringe benefit
area, one could even argue that the employment of the public choice
constraint in those rules was an accident-the inadvertant result of a
complicated solution to a knotty substantive and drafting problem.
However, its appearance in another, unrelated area of the Code, the
area governing the taxation of international transactions discussed
in part III of this article, suggests that the public choice constraint is
more than that. It suggests, instead, that the constraint may provide
a powerful tool for explaining and analyzing the success of provi-
sions in the Code governing the tax treatment of group activities,
such as partnerships, corporations, and associations.
III
INTERNATIONAL TAX
The fringe benefit rules are not the only set of rules in the Code
which utilize the public choice constraint to limit tax avoidance.
The constraint also appears in one of the most technical and arcane
areas of international tax law, the Subpart F rules.230 Specifically, it
appears in the definition of specially disfavored "controlled foreign
corporations." 23 1 To understand the role of the public choice con-
straint in this context, one must first consider Subpart F's role in the
United States scheme for taxation of international transactions.
A. Statutory Overview
With very few exceptions, the United States does not levy an
income tax directly on the foreign-sourced income 232 of foreign cor-
porations, 233 even when those corporations are wholly or partially
owned by United States residents, citizens, or corporations. 234
230 Sections 951 through 964 of the Internal Revenue Code are known as the "Sub-
part F" provisions. Technically they comprise Subpart F of Part III of Subchapter N of
the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. §§ 951-64.
231 See I.R.C. § 957(a) (defining "controlled foreign corporation").
232 Sections 862 through 863 of the Internal Revenue Code provide rules for deter-
mining whether income is foreign-sourced or sourced within the United States. See
I.R.C. §§ 861-63. The highly particularized rules for specific transactions, generally at-
tribute income to the locality where the bulk of the income producing activities are
performed.
233 A foreign corporation is any corporation other than one "created or organized in
the United States or under the laws of the United States or of any State." I.R.C.
§§ 7701(a)(4)-(5).
234 See H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1962); W. GIFFORD & E.
OWENS, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF U.S. INCOME TAxATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 6-7
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Rather, foreign-sourced income is generally taxable only after its
distribution to domestic (United States) taxpayers as dividends or
gains from the disposition of the foreign corporation's shares. The
shareholder then pays federal income tax on those dividend or gain
amounts in accordance with normal tax rules. 23 5
This taxing regime creates tax advantages for United States tax-
payers willing to invest in foreign jurisdictions with lower income
taxes. By engaging in foreign activities through a foreign corpora-
tion organized and operated in a low tax jurisdiction,23 6 investors
can defer payment of a portion-and often a very large portion-of
their tax burden. Investors in domestic corporations do not have
this opportunity to defer taxation; their corporation's income is
taxed as it is earned.23 7 Because deferral is the economic equivalent
of a reduction in the overall tax rate, 238 this tax regime lowers "for-
eign" (United States investors investing through foreign corpora-
tions) investors' tax burden below that of wholly domestic
investors, 23 9 and leaves them with higher after-tax profits from the
(1982); R. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY UNITED STATES TAXPAYERS-AN
OVERVIEW 50 (1981); Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 Colum. L. Rev.
1151, 1183 (1981). The United States taxes foreign corporations only on income which
is "received from sources within the United States," I.R.C. § 881(a), or "which is effec-
tively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States." I.R.C.
§ 882(a)(1). Most "effectively connected income" is "income from sources within the
United States." See I.R.C. § 864(c).
235 See H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 234, at 57; W. GIFFORD & E. OWENS, supra
note 234, at 7. The taxpayer may, however, be entitled to take a credit against his
United States income tax liability for foreign income taxes paid by the foreign corpora-
tion with respect to the income so distributed, as well as for the taxpayer's foreign in-
come taxes resulting from the distribution. See I.R.C. §§ 901-02. For a comprehensive
explanation of this elaborate tax credit scheme, see, e.g., P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, IN-
TRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 79-102 (1981); 2 R. RHOADES
& M. LANGER, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS § 5 (1988); AMERI-
CAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT-INTERNATONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED
STATES INCOME TAXATION 307-421 (1987).
236 A "low tax jurisdiction" is any jurisdiction that exacts less income tax than does
the United States.
237 I.R.C. § 11.
238 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 235, at 172; W. GIFFORD & E. OWENS,
supra note 234, at 129-30; Kingson, supra note 234, at 1183.
239 Aside from deferral, the total tax burden on United States investments abroad is
equivalent to the burden on domestic investments. See H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note
234, at 57. This equivalence is "approximate." See 2 R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, supra
note 235, § 5.01[1]. In addition to deficiencies in the tax credit computation formula,
which in some cases keep the credit from exactly offsetting the foreign tax burden, dif-
ferences in source, exclusion, or deduction rules may tax certain items of income twice.
See 3 B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 69-11 (1981); King-
son, supra note 234 at 1185-87. Moreover, individual United States taxpayers are not
allowed a tax credit for foreign taxes paid by a foreign corporation they have invested in.
See I.R.C. § 902. Thus, if the corporation pays foreign taxes, the taxpayer's total tax
burden (foreign and domestic) will exceed that imposed on United States citizens mak-
ing domestic, unincorporated investments. As compared to making domestic incorpo-
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same investment than domestic investors.
Proponents of this "deferral" tax advantage contend that it not
only encourages United States citizens to invest overseas, but also
that it is necessary to preserve the competitiveness of domestic com-
panies operating abroad. Any businesses that Americans can suc-
cessfully operate in low tax jurisdictions, it is argued, foreign
investors can carry on equally well. If the United States revoked its
investors' favorable tax treatment, the argument continues, foreign
investors would use their now unique tax advantage to overwhelm
their American competitors, wherever located. In short, far from
encouraging United States investors to repatriate their overseas op-
erations to the United States, eliminating their tax advantage would
cause United States investors to lose their overseas operations to
foreign competitors without any corresponding increase in Ameri-
can investment. The end result would be an even larger decline in
American jobs, exports, and tax revenues than results from allowing
deferral to continue. 240
Though generally convinced by this argument,24 1 Congress
eventually recognized that a deferral regime may permit a number
of abuses. First, some foreign corporations held passive invest-
ments, rather than engaging in active trades or businesses. Passive
corporations did not face the competitive pressures Congress was
concerned about.242 Their existence was also unlikely to spur
rated investments, however, individual taxpayers investing abroad through lightly taxed
foreign corporations come out ahead because the United States does not force payment
of the differential between the foreign and United States corporate income tax. See 3 B.
BITrKER, supra at 69-19. Finally, the equivalency breaks down altogether when the for-
eign corporation pays higher taxes abroad than in the United States; then the tax burden
approximates the higher of the two national rates. R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, supra note
235.
240 See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESs., RECOMMEN-
DATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME 48-51 (Comm. Print 1977)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]; H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 234, at 57-58; AMERI-
CAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 235, at 173.
241 Congress has on several occasions considered legislation that would completely
end deferral but has always rejected such proposals because of "the need to maintain
active American business operations abroad on an equal competitive footing with other
operating businesses in the same foreign countries." H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note
234, at 62. This report stated:
Your committee's bill does not go as far as the President [sic] recommen-
dations [to completely eliminate tax deferral because] ... to impose the
U.S. tax currently on the U.S. shareholders of American-owned busi-
nesses operating abroad would place such firms at a disadvantage with
other firms located in the same areas not subject to U.S. tax.
Id. at 57-58. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 240, at 59 (concluding, after dis-
cussion of merits of various proposals to restrict or end deferral, "not to make any rec-
ommendations to change the law").
242 See H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 234, at 62.
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American exports. 243 Allowing them favorable tax treatment, there-
fore seemed both futile (in that it served no apparent purpose) and
dangerous to the federal fisc.244 Second, investors sometimes even
misused foreign corporations engaged (or apparently engaged) in
overseas business operations. Some employed schemes to divert
corporate income corporations earned in the United States or an-
other high tax jurisdiction to related foreign corporations in low tax
jurisdictions "by artificial arrangements between parent and subsidi-
ary regarding intercompany pricing, the transfer of patent licensing
rights, the shifting of management fees, and similar practices. ' '245
Such investors achieved the advantages of deferral for those profits,
and gained a competitive advantage over domestic competitors who
243 Various witnesses testified that American companies operating overseas spurred
United States exports because the companies were more likely than foreign owned en-
terprises to purchase United States components and equipment. See id. at 57. Passive
investment companies, by contrast, do not purchase components or equipment.
244 Because the cost of establishing and running a foreign passive investment corpo-
ration was fairly low, there was potential for widespread avoidance of all United States
taxation of passive income on capital investment. Theoretically, almost all owners will-
ing to accumulate rather than immediately spend such income could have postponed
(possibly forever) United States income taxation merely by holding their investments-
even some of their domestic investments-in foreign corporations. Congess had earlier
addressed the specter of widespread avoidance by imposing a penalty tax on "foreign
personal holding companies" owned by a small number of United States individuals. See
I.R.C. §§ 551-58. See generally H.R. Doc. No. 337, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1937);
Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937, 5 U. CI. L. REV. 41, 49-52 (1937). Those
provisions had no effect, however, on foreign corporations owned by widely held do-
mestic corporations or by more than five individuals. See AMERICAN LAW INsTrrJTE, supra
note 235, at 190 (criticizing narrow reach of foreign personal holding company
provisions).
245 Hearing on the Tax Recommendations of the President Contained in his Message Transmitted
to Congress Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, April 20, 1961, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1961) (excerpt from President Kennedy's State of the Union Message). See also H.R.
REP. No. 1447, supra note 234, at 58; R. GORDON, supra note 234, at 50-51, 62-63
(describing various methods of effecting diversions). The Internal Revenue Service had
the power to police such abuses. As early as 1921, Congress gave the Commissioner the
authority to "consolidate accounts for related trades or businesses" for the purpose of
"making an accurate distribution or apportionment of gains, profits, income, deduc-
tions, or capital between or among such related trades or businesses." Revenue Act of
1921, § 240(d), reprinted in R. GORDON, supra note 234, at 52. This statutory language
empowers the Service to reallocate income that has been improperly assigned to an en-
tity established in a low tax jurisdiction to a related United States taxpayer and subject it
to current taxation in the United States. In 1928, the predecessor of section 482 re-
placed section 240(d) and provided for the allocation of gross income or deductions
among related entities. Section 482 remains "one of the most important anti-avoidance
provisions in the law." Id. at 52. Nonetheless, the expense and time required to win an
adjustment pursuant to this provision keep section 482 from being as effective as its
drafters hoped it would be. This expense is in no small part due to the inordinately
complicated, and in some degree unworkable, regulations promulgated under section
482, see id. at 129-30; Cohen & Hankin, A Decade of DISC: Genesis and Analysis, 2 VA. TAx
REv. 7, 17 (1982) ("implementation of section 482 has been inconsistent and confus-
ing"); Fuller, Problems in Applying the § 482 Intercompany Pricing Regs. Accentuated by DuPont
Case, 52J. TAx'N 10 (1980).
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were unable or unwilling to participate in such schemes. 246 Finally,
Congress believed many taxpayers deferred tax for too long, or
avoided taxation completely by repatriating their foreign profits in
forms which, unlike dividends, did not trigger the imposition of a
catch-up United States income tax.247 These taxpayers received
more of a tax benefit than necessary to meet foreign competition,
while simultaneously placing domestic competitors lacking such tax
benefits (and perhaps paying taxes at a higher rate to compensate
the federal fisc for the associated revenue loss) at a comparative
disadvantage.
Concern over these abuses led to the enactment, in 1962, of
"Subpart F"; a set of tax rules in sections 951 through 964 of the
Code. These rules withdraw the deferral privilege from income
generated in a narrowly defined set of transactions.
The operative provision in Subpart F, section 951, requires
"United States shareholders" of "controlled foreign corporations"
to include their pro rata share of the corporation's "Subpart F in-
come" and "increases in profits invested in the United States" in
their own income in the year earned or invested by the foreign cor-
poration.248 In most cases, the effect of including these items in in-
come is that the shareholder pays a federal income tax
approximately equal to the tax it would have paid had it, rather than
the foreign entity, earned those income items. 249
Subpart F income, as originally defined in section 952 of the
Code, included income derived from the insurance of United States
risks and "base company income." 250 The latter is a technical term
encompassing foreign personal holding company income (essen-
tially passive income), sales income from property purchased from
or sold to a related party whenever the property is manufactured
246 See supra text accompanying note 239.
247 H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 234, at 58.
248 I.R.C. § 951(a)(1).
249 Like shareholders receiving dividend distributions from foreign corporations, see
supra note 235, corporate shareholders receiving "deemed distributions" under Subpart
F are entitled to a tax credit for foreign income taxes paid on the deemed distribution.
See I.R.C. § 960. Individual shareholders are allowed a choice of tax treatment: they
may step forward and pay the entire second tier of the two level tax at the time the
deemed distribution is included in their income or they may elect to be treated as a
corporate shareholder at that time (i.e., pay the difference between the foreign and
United States corporate tax burdens), and pay the (entire) shareholder level tax when
profits are actually distributed. See I.R.C. § 962. Both the amount of foreign tax paid
and the expected timing of the actual dividend distribution will affect the choice.
250 Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12(a), 76 Stat. 960, 1008 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 952). See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 30
(1962). Congress later added several additional components to the definition of Sub-
part F income as a means of enforcing several essentially unrelated regulatory schemes.
See R. GORDON, supra note 234, at 57.
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and sold for use, consumption or disposition outside the corpora-
tion's country of incorporation, income derived from services per-
formed outside the country of the corporation's incorporation for,
on behalf of, or with substantial assistance from a related party, and
certain shipping income.25 ' These transactions were singled out be-
cause they lack an obvious business connection to the country of
incorporation which generated congressional suspicion that the
company was "separat[ing] [income] from manufacturing activities
of a related corporation merely to obtain a lower rate of tax."' 252
The involvement of a related party suggested that the companies
agreed to overstate sales and service income to achieve this separa-
tion.25 3 Thus the income was doubly suspicious and disfavored.
Despite the fact that all Subpart F income was equally likely to
be generated in pursuance of an illicit2 54 tax avoidance scheme,
251 R. GORDON, supra note 234, at 56. See I.R.C. § 954(a).
252 S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1962). See also S. REP. No. 313, supra
note 62, at 363 (reaffirming that "it is generally appropriate to impose current U.S. tax
on easily movable income earned through a controlled foreign corporations since there
is likely to be limited economic reason for the U.S. person's use of the foreign corpora-
tion"). Indeed, prior to the passage of the 1986 Tax Act, income falling within the
technical description of base company income could nonetheless be excluded if the tax-
payer could prove to the satisfaction of the Secretary that neither the creation, organiza-
tion or acquisition of the foreign corporation, nor the "effecting of the transaction
giving rise to such income.., has as one of its significant purposes a substantial reduc-
tion of income, war profits, or excess profits or similar taxes." I.R.C. § 954(b)(4) (1985)
(amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221(d), 100 Stat. 2085.
Such income is still excludable if the taxpayer can prove it "was subject to an effective
rate of income tax imposed by a foreign country greater than 90 percent of the maxi-
mum rate of tax specified in section 11." I.R.C. § 954(b)(4).
253 See H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 234, at 58. One could accomplish this over-
statement in a number of ways. For example, a United States manufacturing company
selling goods overseas could form a foreign corporation in a tax haven country to make
those sales. The parent could then sell the goods to the subsidiary at a small or zero
profit, while the subsidiary would sell them to the ultimate customer at a substantial
markup. The profits on sales would escape taxation in the United States and could accu-
mulate free of tax in a tax haven. Of course, some of this "profit on the sale" is really
manufacturing profit and should be taxable immediately in the United States. However,
unless the United States manufacturer makes similar sales to unrelated parties at higher
prices, the Service will have great difficulty justifying a reallocation pursuant to section
482. See R. GORDON, supra note 234, at 129.
254 That is, one which the Service could successfully challenge under general tax
principles and statutes if it possessed all the relevant information. Obtaining informa-
tion, especially in the context of international transactions, was and still is quite difficult,
expensive and time consuming. See id. at 180. Indeed, a major focus of reform efforts in
the international tax arena is improving our information gathering abilities. See Crinion,
Information Gathering on Tax Evasion in Tax Haven Countries, 20 INT'L LAw. 1209, 1224
(1986) (describing recent United States advances in information gathering); Rosen, An
Interview with Outgoing International Tax Counsel Stephen E. Shay: Part One, 36 TAx NoTEs
759, 764 (1987) (identifying as "major accomplishment" of his tenure in office "pro-
gram to improve international cooperation in the enforcement of tax laws" through pro-
mulgation of treaties, tax information exchange agreements, and the multilateral treaty
for administrative assistance).
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Congress only withdrew the deferral privilege from income which
benefited "United States shareholder[s]" of "controlled foreign cor-
porations." 255 American entities or individuals owning less than the
10% interest in a foreign corporation required to attain "United
States shareholder" status, 256 and those owning shares of foreign
entities no more than half-owned by United States shareholders 257
could continue to enjoy deferral with respect to "their" Subpart F
income. 258 Congress enacted these limitations because of fairness
considerations. The former exception, a "de minimis rule," prevents
the attribution of undistributed income back to small shareholders
whose "influence on the corporation's policy is presumably negligi-
ble."' 259 Although Congress did not explain the second exception,
the majority ownership requirement, its widely assumed purpose
was to avoid subjecting shareholders who lacked the power to force
dividend distributions to cash flow problems by requiring payment
of tax on undistributed corporate income or forcing them to assume
responsibility for misbehavior they could not control. 260 One has to
255 I.R.C. § 951(a)(1). The relevant language has not changed since its original en-
actment in 1962.
256 See I.R.C. § 951(b).
257 See I.R.C. § 957(a) (1985). For a discussion of changes made in this definition by
the 1986 Tax Act, see infra notes 320-22 and accompanying text.
258 Unless, of course, the Service mounted a successful challenge to the scheme
under section 482, see supra note 245, or section 269 (authorizing the Secretary to reject
any credit, allowance, or deduction if the principal purpose of acquisition of control of a
corporation is evasion or avoidance of federal income tax). Note 245, supra, discusses
the problems of relying on section 482 to stop tax avoidance schemes; although section
269 is "[a]rguably ... ideally suited to deal with tax haven transactions," it is not "vigor-
ously" applied in that context. R. GORDON, supra note 234, at 133.
259 H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 234, at 59.
260 See e.g., R. HELLAWELL & R. PUGH, TAXATION OF TRANSNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
1987-1988 251-52 (1987) (definition of a "controlled foreign corporation" adopted in
1962 to insure "that a United States taxpayer holding merely a portfolio.., interest in a
foreign corporation would not be subjected to the serious penalty of being taxed in the
United States on ... undistributed earnings... even though he lacked the voting power
needed to force distribution of those earnings"); L. KRAUSE & K. DAM, FEDERAL TAX
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INCOME 11-12 (1964):
The unfairness argument has more force when the U.S. shareholders
have no connection with one another .... [O]ne shareholder may be
required to pay a tax even though he has neither the funds to pay nor the
power to force a dividend. Such a shareholder would be particularly
wronged if he acquired his stock before Congress eliminated deferral.
Aland, The Treasury Report on Tax Havens-A Response, 59 TAXES 993, 1007 (1981) (decry-
ing as unfair and possibly unconstitutional a suggestion that the more than 50% mini-
mum be dropped); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 235, at 191 ("fundamental
questions of fairness arise if Americans are to be taxed on income which they cannot, in
combination with other similarly situated American taxpayers, cause to be distributed to
them"). Cf. Estate of Nettie S. Miller, 45 T.C. 760, 766-67 (1965) (power to force distri-
bution of dividends required if the foreign personal holding company regime is to ac-
complish its purpose). See also I.R.C. § 6166 (deferral of estate taxes permissible where
estate consists largely of interest in closely held business).
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wonder whether Congress was too generous, however, because
these limitations provided a roadmap for taxpayers wishing to avoid
the strictures of Subpart F while continuing to engage in abusive
schemes. Determined taxpayers needed only to join forces with one
another to continue business as usual.261 For example, 11 taxpayers
could join together to form a foreign entity in which each held a
9.09 percent interest. None would be considered U.S. shareholders
of this entity, and thus the entity would not be deemed a controlled
foreign corporation. Presumably, such cooperative ventures
presented an easy escape from Subpart F.
B. The Role of the Public Choice Constraint
In fact, no massive avoidance of the scheme emerged; indeed,
the regime has been so successful at accomplishing its intended pur-
pose that it became the model for legislatures of several countries
drafting similar legislation.2 62 In large measure, this success is due
to the effects of the public choice constraint. It is not easy for an
investor to find other investors with compatible business goals that
will remain compatible over time, or to work out mutually accepta-
ble resolutions of those differences that arise. For a business entity
to commit itself to an enterprise over which it lacks effective control
may entail running business risks that outweigh the tax benefits gen-
erated from the arrangement.
Subpart F entities are more vulnerable to such problems than
most businesses because their shareholders generally lack a com-
mon business (as opposed to tax) agenda. The existence of such
conflicts are not fatal to many more common business ventures,
such as publicly held corporations. Subpart F corporations are
often different from other businesses, however. Rather than gener-
ating income through their own efforts and activities, many tax ha-
ven entities are essentially collecting agents for income that other,
related entities really earn.263 Thus, rather than trying to work to-
261 The exact number of accomplices required depends on their nationality. Assum-
ing the original United States taxpayer owns 50% of the foreign corporation, one for-
eigner, or some combination of United States nationals and aliens, can own the
remaining 50%o One can maintain total United States ownership with one 50%o owner
and six 8 1/3% owners.
262 See generally R. GORDON, supra note 234, at 24-26 (describing similar German,
Canadian, French, andJapanese regimes); Tillinghast, The Contributions of Stanley S. Surrey
to the International Aspects of Taxation, 38 NAT'L TAxJ. 267, 269 (1985) (same).
263 Attributing this income to the collecting agent for federal income tax purposes
may be legitimate or illegal, depending upon whether the assignment accords with ap-
plicable statutes and regulations. For administrative and other reasons, the Code and
regulations allow some income attributions that lack economic integrity to be recog-
nized for tax purposes; in other cases, however, taxpayers are merely taking advantage
of the paucity of audit coverage to engage in unlawful pricing schemes. The Internal
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gether towards a common business goal (or derive profits from en-
gaging in a common business enterprise), each shareholder's
primary concern is protecting its share of the "corporate" income
from other shareholders.
Nowhere is the inevitability and insurmountability of this con-
flict more evident than in the problem of how to invest "corporate"
profits. Many of the options available to domestic corporations are
not available to Subpart F corporations. Distributing profits to
shareholders in the form of dividends would trigger immediate
United States taxation.264 Reinvestment in the foreign corpora-
tion's business is impractical because the corporation does not have
much of a business. (That is, after all, why the income it earns is
Subpart F income. If the entity manufactures the goods it sells, for
example, the resulting sales income would not be Subpart F in-
come.) 265 That leaves open just two possibilities: the foreign entity
can invest directly in the shareholders' businesses; or it can make
Revenue Service recently identified the international tax arena as a high priority for
future enforcement efforts. See Tax Reform: Arm's-Length Standard Still Applies Under New
"Super Royalty" Rules, Treasuy Official Says, 31 DAILY TAx REP. G-1 (Feb. 18, 1987).
264 The United States parent would, of course, include any foreign dividends in its
income for tax purposes and pay tax accordingly. The normal dividends-received-de-
duction does not apply to dividends received from most foreign corporations, see I.R.C.
§ 243(a), while the special dividends-received-deduction applicable to dividends re-
ceived from foreign corporations only allows deductions for dividends attributable to
income "effectively connected to the conduct of a trade or business within the United
States" (and on which a full United States income tax has already been paid). See I.R.C.
§ 245(a)(5). Thus, unless the United States parent has sufficient foreign tax credits to
offset the additional income tax due (in which case, it would have no need to utilize a
decontrolled tax haven entity at all), the receipt of a dividend from a tax haven entity
triggers substantial federal tax liability. Paying a dividend to an intermediate foreign
corporation controlled by the parent would generally also trigger United States tax lia-
bility because the dividend would be Subpart F income (base company foreign personal
holding company income) in the hands of the intermediary corporation. See I.R.C.
§ 954(c)(I)(A). The parent would pay tax accordingly unless less than the lesser of 5%
of the intermediary's gross income or $1,000,000 consisted of foreign base company
income. I.R.C. § 954(b)(3). Of course, in that case the taxpayer again had no need to
resort to a decontrolled tax haven entity, unless some reason prevented the intermedi-
ary from earning the Subpart F income directly. Finally, although prior to the effective
date of the 1986 Tax Act the Code excluded from the definition of foreign personal
holding company income:
dividends and interest received from a related person which (i) is created
or organized under the laws of the same foreign country under the laws
of which the controlled foreign corporation is created and organized, and
(ii) has a substantial part of its assets used in its trade or business located
in such same foreign county
I.R.C. § 954(c)(4)(A) (1985), an intermediary corporation receiving a dividend or inter-
est payment from a decontrolled tax haven entity could not take advantage of this exclu-
sion because decontrol prevents the entity from being "related." See I.R.C. § 954(d)(3)
(1985).
265 See I.R.C. § 954(d)(1) (defining "foreign base company sales income"). Of
course, the corporation must undertake some business activities to prevent the Service
from disregarding it as a "sham." See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469
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passive investments such as the purchase of stocks and other securi-
ties of unrelated companies.
There are problems with the former option. The other share-
holders will also have to invest in the individual shareholder's busi-
nesses-businesses in which the other shareholders may have little
control, expertise, or interest. 266 These investments, unlike a stan-
dard portfolio investment (which also may be in businesses over
which the shareholder enjoys little control, expertise, or interest),
cannot readily be alienated. In short, each stockholder would soon
find its profits "hostages" of the other shareholders, a situation in-
tolerable to many potential investors.
Only the last option, making passive investments in unrelated
third parties, is a realistic alternative for diverted profits. Even this
alternative, however, may not always be attractive. 267 A putative
shareholder may find it quite difficult to identify and organize a suf-
ficient number of other shareholders with similar investment strate-
gies and goals to make a decontrolled entity possible, especially if
each investor wants to retain significant control over investments. 268
(1935); Bass v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 595, 600 (1968). However, these activities may
be fairly nominal.
266 This problem can be solved if each shareholder's interest in the foreign entity
can be tied to the profitability of the investments made in that shareholder's business
operations, rather than the investments made in the other shareholders' businesses.
Few taxpayers have attempted this maneuver; it remains to be seen whether one could
do so without jeopardizing the desired tax results. See Sheppard, GM's Class E Stock: Tax
Planning in Second Gear, 36-2 TAx NoTEs 130, 135 (1987) (evaluating tax questions cre-
ated by General Motor's attempt to link return on Class E stock, issued to old sharehold-
ers of Electronic Data Systems ("EDS") in merger transaction, to performance of EDS as
a "division"; concluding all predictions of tax consequences rest "on shaky ground").
267 Further, some investors may prefer retaining access to their "foreign" profits for
use in their domestic business operations to achieving the tax benefits obtainable
through use of a decontrolled entity. Although it is not impossible to access profits
invested through a decontrolled entity, it is fairly difficult to do so. One court-approved
method a shareholder may use to gain access to such profits is to pledge his or her
shares in the decontrolled entity as security for a loan. See Ludwig v. Commissioner, 68
T.C. 979 (1977). Although Treasury subsequently adopted a regulation that impairs the
ability of some stockholders of controlled foreign corporations to utilize this technique,
see Treas. Reg. § 1.956-2 (C)(2), this regulation should not adversely impact shareholders
in decontrolled entities.
268 Indeed, Congress relied on the inability of approximately the same number of
individuals to agree on such a strategy when it enacted the statutory precursors of the
Subpart F regime (the "personal holding company" and "foreign personal holding com-
pany" provisions of the Code). See Lubick, Personal Holding Companies-Yesterday, Today
and Tomorrow, 42 TAXES 855, 860 (1964).
Like Subpart F, these provisions (now codified at I.R.C. §§ 541-47; 551-58) accord
especially unfavorable tax treatment to a particular class of income derived by narrowly
defined types of entities. The personal holding company provisions impose a 50% pen-
alty tax on the undistributed "personal holding company income" of "personal holding
companies." I.R.C. § 541 (corporations more than 50% of whose stock (measured by
value) is held by 5 or fewer individuals, I.R.C. § 542(a)(2), and 60 percent or more of
whose adjusted gross income is "personal holding company income," I.R.C.
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However, in the absence of a personal or institutional stake in any
particular investment, an acceptable compromise (both immediately
and in the future) is more likely than in alternative situations. Thus,
the Subpart F rules allow some leeway for achieving advantageous
tax treatment.
The class of investors most willing to reinvest foreign earned
profits in stocks and securities of unrelated entities and in other pas-
sive investments are those investors whose underlying business is to
make passive investments. Moreover, the same attributes which al-
low compromise on the reinvestment decision extend (with similarly
beneficial effects) to the initial investment decisions. The public
choice constraint is not as effective on passive investors as it is on
investors operating active businesses because the dilemmas are not
as acute for passive investors as for active ones, and because com-
promises are easier to work out. As a result, it is easier to form and
maintain relatively large groups of passive ",1vestors than active in-
vestors. This is significant because if a group is large enough, it falls
outside Subpart F.
Congress has responded to the greater ability of passive inves-
tors to avoid Subpart F. As early as 1962, Congress included a more
stringent rule for insurance companies, one variety of passive inves-
tors.269 The rule reduced the more than 50% United States owner-
ship requirement for controlled foreign corporation status to a
more than 25% ownership standard for foreign insurers receiving
more than 75% of their gross "premiums or other consideration"
from the insurance of United States risks or lives. 270 Congress spe-
cifically intended the amendment "to cover cases where the princi-
pal business is the U.S. risks but the control is decreased in order to
§ 542(a)(1)). United States shareholders of "foreign personal holding companies" (for-
eign corporations more than 50% of whose stock (measured by voting power or value) is
owned by 5 or fewer individual citizens or residents of the United States, I.R.C.
§ 552(a) (2), and 60% or more of whose adjusted gross income is comprised of "foreign
personal holding company income," I.R.C. § 552(a)(1)) must include their pro rata
share of this corporate income in their gross income on a current basis. I.R.C. § 551(a).
Both types of personal holding company income include dividends, interest, certain
rents and royalties, and income generated from personal service contracts. I.R.C.
§§ 543, 553. "[F]oreign personal holding company income" also includes gains from
the sale or exchange of stocks, securities, and commodities futures. I.R.C. § 553(a)(2)-
(3).
269 Although some portions of an insurance company's business are indisputably
.,active," a key portion consists of building up reserves through investment of premium
dollars. See Note, Revenue Ruling 77-316 and Carnation Co. v. Commissioner: An Analysis
of the Attack on Captive Offshore Insurance Companies, 2 VA. TAX REv. 111, 113 (1982) (point-
ing out one advantage of using captive insurance companies is that a "captive controls
its own investment decisions").
270 Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12(a), 76 Stat. 960, 1008 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 957(b)).
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avoid application of this provision." 271 At the same time, Congress
imposed a different, but almost equally stringent taxing regime on
United States persons owning stock in "foreign investment compa-
nies," foreign corporations which were either registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 as management companies or as
unit investment trusts, 2 72 or were primarily engaged in the business
of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities at a time when
United States persons held a majority of the voting power or value
of its stock.2 73 United States persons owning interests in foreign
investment companies had to report all gain from the sale or ex-
change of these interests as ordinary income 274 or, if the company
made the necessary election, they could receive 90%o of their share
of the corporation's taxable income on an annual basis with the re-
mainder realized as capital gain on the eventual sale or exchange of
the shares. 275
C. Revisitation of the Rules
Over time, Congress became convinced that both of these re-
gimes were too narrow, 2 7 6 and it included provisions in the 1986
271 H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 234, at 60; S. REP. No. 1881, supra note 252, at
82. Interestingly, this rule only led to taxation of insurance companies' "net underwrit-
ing income" attributable to the insurance of United States risks, the income "which
would (subject to certain modifications) be taxed under Subchapter L of Chapter 1 if the
controlled foreign corporation were a domestic insurance corporation." S. REP. No.
1881, supra, at 242. See I.R.C. § 953(a)(2). Most of an insurance company's passive in-
come remained free of domestic tax. See Note, supra note 269, at 111 (Subpart F leaves
"largely undisturbed" the tax benefits of using an offshore captive insurer). As a result,
the Internal Revenue Service challenged some of these arrangements by contending that
the arrangements did not provide insurance because the risks being insured remained
within the economic family and, hence, disallowed the parent's deduction of insurance
premiums paid to the captive. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53; Carnation Co.
v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400 (1978), aft'd, 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 965 (1981). However, by the Service's own admission, multiple ownership of the
captive, as well as the issuance of policies to unrelated insureds, destroys this ground of
attack. See Rev. Rul. 78-338, 1978-2 C.B. 107 (allowing deduction for premiums paid to
insurance "captive" owned by, and insuring the risks of, 31 unrelated parties).
272 Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 14, 76 Stat. 960, 1036 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 1246(b)(1)).
273 Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 14, 76 Stat. 960, 1036-37 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 1246(b)(2)).
274 Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 14, 76 Stat. 960, 1036 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 1246(a)).
275 Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 14, 76 Stat. 960, 1036 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 1246(a)(1)).
276 See S. REP. No. 313, supra note 62, at 393:
The committee understands that the abuses the Congress was concerned
with in 1962 when the foreign investment company provisions were en-
acted have advanced to a point where present law is basically inoperative.
The committee is aware that present foreign corporations that invest in
passive assets limit U.S. ownership in such funds so that Section 1246
rarely applies.
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Tax Act to further limit opportunities for United States taxpayers to
achieve deferral advantages for foreign-earned passive income.
These provisions broaden the scope of the special foreign insurance
company regime and establish a new taxing regime applicable to so-
called "passive foreign investment companies."
1. Extending the Foreign Insurance Company Regime
The 1986 Tax Act broadens the scope of the special insurance
provisions in three ways. First, it greatly expands the amount of an
insurance company's receipts potentially includable in the current
income of a United States shareholder under Subpart F. Second, it
loosens the controlled foreign corporation's United States owner-
ship provisions for some Subpart F purposes. Finally, the 1986 Tax
Act narrows the de minimis exception formerly applicable to insur-
ance income. Each of these changes is explained in greater detail
below.
The expansion of includable receipts is accomplished through
two distinct changes: elimination of exclusions for income gener-
ated by the investment of unearned premiums, reserves, and certain
other funds from personal holding company income;277 and expan-
sion of the definition of "insurance income" includable in Subpart F
income. The definition of "insurance income" now includes income
attributable to the insurance of risks arising in any country other
than "the country under the laws of which the controlled foreign
corporation is created or organized[.]" 278 Thus, if the foreign in-
surance company is a controlled foreign corporation, only insurance
income attributable to risks located in its country of incorporation
qualifies for deferral; all other income is taxed (through its United
States shareholders) approximately as if the insurance company
were a domestic corporation.2 79
Congress also increased the likelihood that some insurance in-
come would be includable in United States stockholders' income
under Subpart F by further loosening the controlled foreign corpo-
ration's United States ownership requirements for purposes of de-
Id.
277 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221(a)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2549
(amending I.R.C. § 954(c)). See also supra note 271 (describing effect of prior
exclusions).
278 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221(b)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2551
(amending I.R.C. § 953(a)). Prior to the 1986 Tax Act, only income attributable to risks
arising in the United States were included. I.R.C. § 953(a)(1) (1985).
279 United States shareholders pay United States tax on their pro rata shares of the
corporation's Subpart F income; if the entire corporation is owned by United States
shareholders, all of its Subpart F income is subject to domestic tax on a current basis.
Otherwise includable Subpart F income avoids domestic tax completely, of course, to
the extent it is attributable to shares held by foreigners.
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termining the tax treatment of "related person insurance company
income." "Related person insurance company income" is all "in-
surance income" attributable to the reinsurance of risks whose pri-
mary insured is a United States shareholder (or a person related to
such a shareholder)280 of the foreign insurer.28' Noting that the
widely dispersed ownership of some captive insurance companies
allowed many shareholder-insureds to escape current taxation
under Subpart F,282 Congress added a rule deeming all United
States persons owning any stock in a foreign insurance company
"United States shareholder[s]" for purposes of determining the tax
treatment of "related person insurance income." 28 3 Thus, if the
combined ownership percentage (measured by voting power or
value)28 4 of the United States persons owning stock in the company
equals or exceeds 25%o, then each United States person, no matter
how small its ownership interest, must include its pro rata share of
the corporation's "related person insurance company income" in its
gross income on a current basis. 285
Finally, the 1986 Tax Act repeals the rule applicable to insur-
ance income 28 6 and collapses it into a narrower test formerly appli-
cable only to foreign base company income.28 7 Prior law excluded
foreign base company income from Subpart F income if it com-
prised less than 10% of the controlled foreign entity's gross in-
come. 28 8 The old law excluded insurance income from Subpart F
income if it amounted to 5% or less of the total of premiums and
280 See I.R.C. § 954(d)(3) (defining related person).
281 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221(b)(2), 100 Stat. 2085, 2551
(currently codified at I.R.C. § 953 (c)(2)). The regulations to be promulgated under this
provision will also apply to mutual insurance companies and will treat the mutual com-
pany policyholders as if they were shareholders of a stock company. I.R.C. § 953(c)(4).
282 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 81, at pt. 2 at 617 (shareholders with less
than 10% of company's stock did not fall within Subpart F).
283 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221(b)(2), 100 Stat. 2085, 2551
(currently codified at I.R.C. § 953(c)(1)).
284 See I.R.C. § 957(b).
285 The Code allows foreign insurers to avoid this rule (and exclude their "related
party insurance income" from income) in three situations: (1) where less than 20% of
the company's shares (measured by voting power or value) are owned by the primary
insured parties (or related parties) under policies of insurance or reinsurance issued by
the company, I.R.C. § 953(c)(3)(A); (2) where the company derives less than 20% of its
insurance income in the form of related person insurance income, I.R.C. § 953(c)(3)(B);
and (3) where the company elects to treat related person insurance income as income
"effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States"
(subjecting it to normal income taxation in the United States), I.R.C. § 953(c)(3)(C).
286 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221(b)(1), 100 Stat. 2085,
2551 (codified at I.R.C. § 953(a)); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 81, at pt. 2 at
616.
287 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1223(a), 100 Stat. 2085,
2557-58; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 81, at pt. 2 at 627.
288 See I.R.C. § 954(b)(3) (1985).
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other consideration received during the year.289 Together, these
two rules allowed entities to receive as much as 15% of their gross
income in the form of Subpart F income and still avoid Subpart F's
strictures. After the 1986 Tax Act, however, an entity's foreign base
company and insurance income must be added together and may be
excluded from income only if the total is below the lesser of 5% of
the corporation's gross income or $1,000,000.290
These changes fundamentally alter the scope of Subpart F's in-
surance provisions. Though their precise impact is not yet known,
Congress expects that they will raise a significant amount of reve-
nue. The five year revenue estimate projects a revenue gain of $184
million from the captive insurance company provisions alone.29'
Other Subpart F changes are expected to raise $685 million.292
2. The New PFIC Regime
The most significant of the international tax reforms in the
1986 Tax Act is a new taxing regime aimed specifically at "passive
foreign investment companies," or "PFICs". United States inves-
tors in PFICs, no matter how small their holdings and without re-
gard to the overall level of United States ownership of the PFIC, fall
within a special taxing regime 293 designed to eliminate the benefits
of deferral. 294
The Code defines a PFIC as any foreign corporation which de-
rives 75% or more of its gross income in the form of passive in-
come, or holds 50% or more of its assets (by value) for the
production of passive income. 295 "Passive income" for these pur-
poses consists generally of income within the definition of passive
income in the foreign tax credit context296 (which in turn refers to
foreign personal holding company income and personal holding
company income).297 It includes dividends, interest, royalties,
rents, annuities, net gains from the sale of non-inventory or non-
dealer property, net non-trade or business commodities gains, net
289 See I.R.C. § 953(a) (1985).
290 I.R.C. § 954(b)(3).
291 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 81, at pt. 2 at 880.
292 Id. at pt. 2 at 879. Not all of this gain comes from amendments to the insurance
company rules. Congress made numerous other changes to Subpart F at the same time.
The revenue estimates, however, do not associate specific revenue gains with particular
amendments.
293 Rubenfeld & Rubin, Passive Foreign Investment Companies: The Pentapus Becomes the
Sextapus, Or Does It?, 36 TAX NoTEs 199, 204 (July 13, 1987).
294 See S. REP. No. 313, supra note 62, at 394; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note
81, at pt. 2 at 641.
295 I.R.C. § 1296(a); Rubenfeld & Rubin, supra note 293, at 204.
296 I.R.C. § 1296(b).
297 I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(A).
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foreign currency gains (to the extent not directly related to the busi-
ness needs of the corporation), and certain income economically
equivalent to, but not denominated as, interest.298 It does not in-
clude any income from the active conduct of a trade or business,
including a banking or insurance business.299
The tax treatment of United States investors in a PFIC depends
upon whether the corporation elects to be treated as a "qualified
electing fund" ("QEF"). Absent such an election, any United States
investor who disposes of PFIC stock at a gain or receives a "total
excess distribution"3 00 with respect to such stock must allocate the
amount of that gain or total excess distribution among the taxable
years the taxpayer held the stock.30 1 The shareholder then includes
amounts attributable to the current year and any year during which
the corporation was not a PFIC in its gross income for the current
year as ordinary income.30 2 To calculate the tax due on amounts
allocated to other years, however, the taxpayer multiplies each
year's amount by the highest rate of tax in effect for such taxable
year under section 1 or section 11.303 The taxpayer also must pay
an interest charge calculated by applying the Code's rate for under-
payments of tax to the tax due with respect to each year for the pe-
riod running from the due date of that year's tax return until the
due date for the return in the year of the disposition or distribu-
tion.30 4 This levy places the taxpayer in the same economic position
as if the gain or excess distribution amounts had been distributed in
298 See I.R.C. § 954(c); Rubenfeld & Rubin, supra note 293, at 204-05. The Act made
a number of changes in the definition of "foreign personal holding company income,"
in order to broaden the definition's scope. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, § 1221(a)(1), 100 Stat. 2085; H. R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 81, at pt. 2 at
611, 613-16 (describing changes); Turner, Foreign Taxation Highlights of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, 21 INt'L LAW. 487, 511-512 (1987) (same).
299 I.R.C. § 1296(b)(2). Congress's exemption of these and other active foreign
businesses from PFIC treatment requires the elimination of indirect taxation through a
foreign holding company parent. See H. R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 81, at pt. 2 at
644. Accordingly, if a parent corporation owns at least 25% (by value) of the stock of a
subsidiary, a special lookthrough rule treats the parent as owning that portion of the
subsidiary's business income. I.R.C. § 1296(c). The Technical and Miscellaneous Reve-
nue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 101 2 (p)(2), 102 Stat. 3342, extends this look-
through rule to indirectly owned, lower-tier subsidiaries.
300 The Code defines "total excess distribution" as the amount of distributions re-
ceived with respect to stock during a taxable year in excess of 125% of the average
amount received in respect of such stock during the preceding three taxable years.
I.R.C. § 1291(b)(2)(A). The rule does not apply during the first taxable year the inves-
tor holds the stock. I.R.C. § 1291(b)(2)(B).
301 Taxpayers ratably allocate the amounts to each day of their holding period for
the stock. I.R.C. § 1291(a)(1)(A).
302 I.R.C. §§ 1291(a)(1)(B), 1291(a)(2).
303 I.R.C. §§ 1291(a)(1)(C), 1291(c)(2).
304 I.R.C. § 1291(c)(3).
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
the form of a dividend in the year they were deemed earned.30 5
United States shareholders of a corporation which elects to be-
come a QEF 30 6 avoid the interest charge and recharacterization
rules described above for gains and income attributable to years
during which a QEF election is in effect.30 7 Instead, they are re-
quired to include their pro rata share of the QEF's profits in their
own gross income on a current basis, and pay current United States
tax on that amount. 308 Alternatively, shareholders may elect to de-
fer payment of these taxes in exchange for an agreement to pay in-
terest on the deferred amount.309 In either case, the regime places
investors in approximately the position they would have been in had
they held their share of the assets directly.
4. Definitional Reforms
Congress's replacement of the public choice constraint with a
more comprehensive device for taxing United States investor-
owned, foreign-earned, passive income is not a complete rejection
of the public choice constraint as a method for controlling tax avoid-
ance in the international arena. The constraint remains important
for discouraging the diversion of active business income to low tax
jurisdictions. Indeed, one of the changes in the Subpart F rules
made by the 1986 Tax Act increases the effect of the public choice
constraint by making it more difficult for a taxpayer to assemble
large numbers of shareholders 310 in circumstances which will avoid
conflicts of interest.
One method of assembling enough shareholders to escape Sub-
part F's strictures without running the risk of their developing
debilitating conflicts of interest is to use related taxpayers and, in
305 Congress clearly intended that United States investors in PFIC's "pay U.S. tax
plus an interest charge based on the value of tax deferral," thereby "eliminating the
economic benefits of deferral." H.R. REP. No. 841, supra note 81, at pt. 2 at 641. How-
ever, under some circumstances, this taxing regime goes further and imposes a heavier
tax burden on investors than would have resulted if the PFIC distributed all its earnings
and profits on a current basis. See Rubenfeld & Rubin, supra note 293, at 206-07.
306 QEF status requires both filing the necessary election form and providing the
Internal Revenue Service with certain types of information. I.R.C. § 1295(a). An elec-
tion, once made, can be revoked only with the permission of the Secretary. I.R.C.
§ 1295(b)(1). See also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1291-1OT (outlining election procedures).
307 I.R.C. § 1291(d)(1); Rubenfeld & Rubin, supra note 293, at 208.
308 I.R.C. § 1293(a)(1). Such amounts retain their QEF status in the shareholder's
hands. Also, 10% shareholders may claim an appropriate foreign tax credit to offset the
United States tax liability. I.R.C. § 1293(o.
309 I.R.C. § 1294. Substantial restrictions apply to this election privilege. For exam-
ple, the privilege is not available for amounts otherwise includable under Subpart F or
the foreign personal holding company rules. See I.R.C. § 1294(b); Rubenfeld & Rubin,
supra note 293, at 209-10.
310 A taxpayer in this situation will try to find enough shareholders to avoid "con-
trolled foreign corporation" status. See supra text accompanying note 261.
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particular, entities related through common ownership. A common
owner has both the power and the incentive to resolve any conflicts
that might arise among the shareholders because it can internalize
and weigh the benefits and disadvantages of each course of ac-
tion.3 1' In fact, this escape from Subpart F is so obvious that when
the regime was first enacted, Congress included in it an attribution
rule which treats all the holdings of related taxpayers as held by one
taxpayer for purposes of determining whether a foreign corporation
is a "controlled foreign corporation. ' 3 1 2 The rule also treats each
shareholder as holding all the shares owned by related taxpayers for
purposes of determining whether any particular shareholder is a
United States shareholder.3 13 Thus, distributing the ownership of a
foreign corporation, X, equally among eleven domestic subsidiaries
of a United States parent, A, gains no tax advantages for A. The
Code deems X a controlled foreign corporation and deems each of
the subsidiaries a United States shareholder required to report its
pro rata share of X's Subpart F income on a current basis. As a
result, all of X's Subpart F income is taxed in the United States on a
current basis.
Closing this escape route did not, however, prevent taxpayers
from experimenting with similar schemes. One which speedily de-
veloped was to create a separate class of stock designed for distribu-
tion to unrelated, generally foreign shareholders. Though this class
of stock had to be assigned enough voting power to avoid classifica-
tion of the corporation as a controlled foreign corporation (i.e. 50%
of the total voting power),3 4 it also contained features which made
the foreign shareholders unlikely ever to desire to exercise this
power contrary to the United States shareholders' interests. In par-
ticular, such shares tended to bear guaranteed, limited dividend
rights and preferential redemption or liquidation rights, which iso-
lated holders from participation in either the upside returns or
downside risks of the corporation's activities. The fact that the
shares typically represented a very small proportion of the corpora-
tion's total capitalized value provided further isolation from eco-
311 As the ultimate beneficiary of the profits and losses generated by each of its sub-
sidiary corporations, a parent corporation or entity has an incentive to maximize the
joint profits of the combined group. If this joint maximization strategy involves short-
changing one of the subsidiaries, the shortfall can be remedied through a series of inter-
corporate dividends or capital contributions; in all probability, however, the group can
ignore the shortfall.
312 See Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12(a), 76 Stat. 960, 1018-19
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 958(b)). The rule also traces ownership back to United
States individuals and entities through intermediary foreign corporations. See id. (codi-
fied as amended at I.R.C. § 958(a)).
313 Id.
314 See I.R.C. § 957(a) (1985).
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nomic risk. Nothing short of a major disaster could imperil the
shareholders' returns and they would not benefit from increased
profits so these shareholders had nothing to gain by participating in
corporate management. Formal control was thus alienated without
the loss of effective control. 315
Schemes like this were obvious enough that Treasury included
a regulation in its first set of Subpart F regulations allowing the In-
ternal Revenue Service to disregard "[a]ny arrangement to shift for-
mal voting power away from United States shareholders . . . if in
reality voting power is retained." 316 However, by its terms, the reg-
ulation requires that the Service prove "the shareholders of such
other class of stock do not exercise their voting rights independently
or fail to exercise their voting rights, and... a principal purpose of
the arrangement is to avoid the classification of such foreign corpo-
ration as a controlled foreign corporation under section 957."'317
Though most courts have upheld the Service's attacks on particular
taxpayers engaged in such schemes, 318 litigating these evidentiary
issues is necessarily expensive for the Service and results are uncer-
tain.3 19 The 1986 Tax Act removes any temptation for taxpayers to
chance the litigation odds, however, by broadening the definition of
a controlled foreign corporation to include any foreign corporation
where United States shareholders own a majority of the stock-mea-
sured by voting power or value.320 The new rule makes it much
more expensive for corporations to achieve decontrol by maintain-
ing a second class of stock and may make maintaining a class of pas-
sive shareholders impossible. Owners of a majority of the stock's
value (and by definition the recipient of half of any increase in
315 See, e.g., Kraus v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 681, 696 (1973) ("[Ihe petitioners
never intended to part with any voting control ... nor did the preferred shareholders
intend to use the voting power nominally carried by their stock."), aft'd, 490 F.2d 898
(2d Cir. 1974); Garlock, Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 423, 435-36 (1972), aff'd, 489
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973) (describing plan "'to pass 50% of the voting rights to foreign-
ers who [would] not have any interest in exercising their vote independently' [of the
petitioner's stock as] . . . nothing could be gained thereby"), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911
(1974).
316 Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(2) (1987) (promulgated in T.D. 6688, 1963-2 C.B.
321).
317 Id.
318 See Koehring Co. v. United States, 583 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1978); Kraus, 56 T.C.
681; Garlock Inc., 58 T.C. 423.
319 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 235, at 237 ("vagueness of the factual
questions posed by the Regulation . . . raise difficult audit problems for the Internal
Revenue Service and invite dispute"). The Service lost one of these cases, CCA, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 137 (1975), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 1 (withdrawn), non acq., 1982-1
C.B. 1.
320 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1222(a)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2556-
57 (codified at I.R.C. § 957(a)).
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value)3 21 will be intensely interested in its business plans. The
Committee Reports state in no uncertain terms that the change is
intended to ward off further attempts at "manipulation. '322
IV
LEssoNs FOR THE FUTURE
In sum, although Congress does not explicitly recognize the
public choice constraint as a method of controlling undesirable tax
avoidance and has not used the restraint with unqualified success,
the constraint has significantly helped in some instances. The cir-
cumstances in which it has proved most successful, as well as those
surrounding its failures, are important because they provide an indi-
cation of where such constraints may (or may not) be useful in the
future.
The first circumstance worth noting is the time factor. For the
constraint to be effective in the tax context, it almost has to apply to
relationships spanning a fairly lengthy time period. The reason for
this is simple; the success of the constraint depends on the taxpay-
ers' having disparate preferences. At any given point in time, a tax-
payer is likely to be able to find others with similar preferences or
desires because there are a great many taxpayers to choose from.
Although finding short term allies may be difficult or expensive, it is
not impossible. By contrast, finding long term allies, groups of tax-
payers whose desires and needs will remain congruent over time, is
nearly an impossible task. Success requires accurate projections of
future events and future attitudes. Not only is accuracy elusive, it is
difficult to convince others of the accuracy of predictions. Lack of
belief in the accuracy of the necessary predictions will cause the ven-
ture to fail just as surely as an actual mistaken prediction since
nonbelivers would refrain from joining the group initially. In the
international tax context, for instance, there is little net benefit in
establishing a decontrolled entity if shareholder dissension forces its
dissolution within a few years. Limited upside returns like this
counsel against incurring the initial expense of establishing such an
entity.323
The second prerequisite for the successful operation of the
public choice constraint is most dearly evident in the passive in-
come area; not only must the taxpayers' interests be disparate, but
strongly so. Taxpayers may overlook relatively small differences in
321 The outside shareholders must get half of the increase in value or their interests
in the corporation will drop below the 50%o threshhold.
322 S. REP. No. 313, supra note 62, at 371; H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 82, at 402.
323 See also supra note 185 (describing effect of time on maintenance of fringe bene-
fits plan).
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opinion or utility or develop a compromise package when significant
tax benefits result. By contrast, if a taxpayer feels strongly about a
particular outcome-if, for example, it is counting on an infusion of
cash from its foreign related entity to fulfill business expansion
plans or foresees heavy medical expenses in the immediate future-
there is less basis for compromise. Stated simply, as it becomes
more important for the taxpayer to "have it his way," the possibility
that obstacles may be placed in that path becomes a more serious
disadvantage.
Finally, although the effect of the public choice constraint may
approach that of an outright prohibition on certain tax conse-
quences, opportunities usually exist for some taxpayers to obtain
favorable tax treatment. The resulting inequality may not be accept-
able on normative grounds. The operation of the public choice con-
straint in the fringe benefit context provides a perfect example of
how this issue arises. Although it makes some sense to use nondis-
crimination rules to redistribute "excess tax benefits" from employ-
ers and highly paid employees to lower paid employees,324 the logic
(aside from the obvious revenue effects) behind allocating tax bene-
fits based on the homogeneity of employee groups' consumption
patterns remains mysterious. In the vast majority of cases, one can-
not argue seriously that homogeneity indicates that such benefits
are more "job related," especially inasmuch as truly job related ben-
efits are completely exempt from the necessity of satisfying any non-
discrimination standards.3 25 Further, allowing employees to choose
between equally valuable benefits probably increases rather than de-
creases equality in their subjective valuations of their wage pack-
ages. Participating employees will derive more equal benefits from
the tax favor granted fringes and will avoid having some employees
324 This scheme also has a number of flaws. Perhaps the most important is that the
size of the levy on rich employers and employees (and the corresponding take of poor
employees) depends on the composition of the entire work force, including its salary
structure, and its members' tastes for fringe benefits, rather than the amount of available
excess tax benefits. Some taxpayers will lose all their excess, while others retain all or
most of theirs solely because of dissimilar co-workers. Meanwhile, some low paid em-
ployees will be denied redistributional gains because their co-workers do not generate
enough excess to make a plan worthwhile from the employer's perspective. In sum, the
scheme still leaves room for considerable disparity in the distribution of tax benefits. Cf.
Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies: Nondiscrimination, Integration, and the Quest for
Worker Security, 42 TAx. L. REV. 433, 466-69 (1987) (describing situations in which the
1986 Tax Act definition of "suspect group" will aggravate inequality of provision of
pension benefits); Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Plans: Good Intentions Confront Eco-
nomic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 432-34 (describing similar problems with pension plan
nondiscrimination rules).
325 See I.R.C. § 132(h)(1) (excluding "working condition fringes" from purview of
nondiscrimination rule applicable to other fringe benefits authorized under section
132).
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derive a very valuable benefit, while others derive very little. Finally,
the modified form of the constraint in the current nondiscrimination
rules undoubtedly favors large organizations over small ones be-
cause random variations in preference patterns are more likely to
cause problems for smaller employee groups than for larger ones.
It seems far more probable, for example, that a situation will arise
where only executives desire dependent care and only the rank and
file desire legal insurance when the entire group consists of three
executives and twenty employees than when it consists of twenty ex-
ecutives and three hundred employees. The larger their group, the
more likely it is that the executives' interests will diverge so that
some desire fringe benefits other than dependent care. Further
(and for the same reason) at least some of the larger group of em-
ployees are likely to want dependent care.326 In short, the distribu-
tional patterns created by the operation of the public choice
constraint in the fringe benefit context may be impossible to accept
over the long term.3 27
By contrast, the number of unrelated shareholders necessary to
escape Subpart F may make it so difficult (or unrewarding) to exag-
gerate profits earned by the foreign corporation (and diverted from
the United States shareholders' domestic corporations) that widely
held foreign corporations simply will not participate in such
schemes. Their income would then be only singly, and not doubly,
suspicious and disfavored.3 28 Allowing these widely held foreign
corporations the advantage of deferral might not, therefore, seem
terribly inequitable or dangerous to the federal fisc. The lack of
possibilities for abuse may justify better tax treatment than accorded
those with opportunity to abuse the benefit. Thus, the use of a pub-
326 Of course, if a small enough group of employees is involved, the employer may
try to hire only those employees who share the fringe benefit preferences of the em-
ployer's executives. That may, however, not be practicable given the size of the em-
ployer's applicant pool.
327 Indeed, if Congress and/or Treasury were truly strategic, one could contend that
the initial objective in using the public choice constraint was to create this distressing
state of affairs, thereby generating political support for the imposition of more straight-
forward and even-handed (but equally revenue protective) limits on fringe benefits.
Although no groundswell of support for such a proposal has materialized to date, small-
business representatives have already begun to complain about the effect the new rules
will have on small businesses' ability to sponsor welfare benefit plans. So far, however,
their complaints have focused on the cost of administering the new standards, rather
than the standards themselves. See, e.g., Welfare Plan Non-Discrimination Rules, Other
Changes Concern Benefit Experts, 13 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1203, 1203 (July 7, 1986); Sheppard,
Lots of Questions, Few Answers on Employee Benefit Complaints, 33 TAx NoTEs 1086, 1088
(1986). This focus may shift once section 89 goes into effect, and taxpayers find out how
difficult it is to meet the standards established therein.
328 See supra text accompanying notes 252-53.
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lic choice constraint rather than the imposition of a flat prohibition
may not create an additional inequity.
CONCLUSION
This Article illustrates situations where the Code relies on dis-
parate interests of superfically similarly situated taxpayers to curb
abusive behavior.329 These disparities affect taxpayer behavior.
How much of a constraint they exert, and whether the exploitation
of that constraint can be squared with other goals or norms of the
tax system, remains to be explored. While Congress takes advan-
tage of the public choice constraint, it has avoided open discussion
not only of whether the constraint is the most appropriate response
to the problem at hand but also of the very fact that it uses the con-
straint. It is time to confront these issues directly so that Congress
can reach a rational concensus as to the constraint's desirability in
the fringe benefit and Subpart F rules as well as its possible applica-
tion to other perennial problem areas of the Code.
329 Although it has long been accepted that our tax system relies on the selfish be-
havior of some taxpayers to keep other taxpayers honest, this phenomenon has only
been discussed in the context of taxpayers on opposite ends of a business transaction.
The Code contains numerous provisions covering situations where parties have shared,
rather than the expected antagonistic, interests. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 269 (disallowing losses
triggered by transactions between related parties); I.R.C. § 465 (limiting basis created
through nonrecourse financing); I.R.C. § 1239 (recharacterizing gain from the sale of
depreciable property between related taxpayers).
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